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Article 3

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

NOTES
ADVERSE PossEssIoN: The Statute of Limitations in a Suit for Ejectment-The question involved in this problem is whether a person can
successfully defend an ejectnent suit by setting up the statute of limitations although he has failed to fulfill some of the requirements of an
adverse possessor, and whether or not it makes any difference if one
claiming title of adverse possession has claim or color of title? Let us
assume that A has been in possession of land for more than twenty
years but has failed to hold it hostilely and without claim or color of
title, has failed to hold it for the statutory period, may B, the true
owner, eject A who pleads the Statute of Limitations?
The decisions and text book writers agree almost unanimously that in
order to bar or prevent the true owner from recovering land held adversely by another claiming ownership of the property through the
operation of the statute of limitations, that the adverse possessor must
have been for the statutory period in exclusive possession, it must be
actual, openly, notoriously, continuously, hostilely, with a claim of right
or color of title or an intent to hold adverse to the true owner's title,
and the world.1 And in some states where the statute fixes a shorter
term of limitations, payment of taxes is expressly made an element of
adverse possession.2 All these elements that are mentioned above are
essential and to lack one of them would prove detrimental to the validity
of the claim of an adverse possessor,3 and the bar of the statute of
limitations will not be complete4 until the requirements are met.
In our problem the adverse possessor although he was in possession
for more than twenty years failed to hold it hostilely for the statutory
period and we see in the Jackson cases an action of ejectment was
brought by J. Berner against J. Jackson to recover the possession of
a lot. The plaintiff (Berner) derived his title from the state, while the
defendants (Jackson) claim to have held through their ancestor G. M.
1 Armstrong v. Morrill 14 Wall 120; 20 L Ed. 765; 1782.
Horn v. Metzger 234 I1 240; 84 N. E. 893; 1908.
W d v. Riper 27 Ind. App. 356; 61 N. E. 608; 1901.
Courtney v. Ashcraft 31 Ky L. Rep. 1324; 105 S. W. 106; 1907.
Warren v. Bowdran 156 Mass, 280; 31 X. E. 300; 1892.
Lasley v. Kniskern 152 Mich 244; 115 X. W. 971; 1908.
See also 15 L. R. A. (N.S) 1189.
2 Seven years' payment of taxes, with color of title and possession.
Ill. Revised Statutes Chap. 83 sec. 6; 1943.
In re Dixion 120 Cal. App. 635; 8 P (2d) 881; 1932.
Blayden v. Morris 37 Idaho 37; 214 P 1039; 1923.
Bryson v. Ferrill (Tex. civ. app) 25 S. W. (2d) 1001; 1930.
Peterson v. Johnson 34 P (2d) 697 (Utah) 1934.
See also C. J. S. sec. 171 page 745.
3

Cook v. Babcock 65 Mass 206; 11 Cush 206; 1853.
4 Beasley v. Howell 117 Ala 499; 22 So. 989; 1898.
Eastern Oregon Land Co. v. Cole 35 CCA 100; 92 Fed. 949; 1899.
5 Jonathan Jackson et al v. Jacob Berner 48 Il 203; 1868.
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Jackson, and have held this property for more than twenty years and
set this up as a bar to the plaintiff's action of ejectment. The court said
that if this possession of the defendants was adverse possession that
the plaintiffs could not recover possession of the land. During the course
of the trial no witness testified that defendants had held any portion
of the land in question in hostility to that claim of the plaintiff or
adversely to plaintiff's claim. The court held "that adverse possession
sufficient to defeat the legal title where there is no paper title must be
hostile in its inception and continue hostile uninterruptedly for twenty
years,"6 and that the statute of limitations did not run in favor of the
defendants and the plaintiff could recover the land. There are many
other cases that hold that adverse possession must be hostile in its
inception and continue so for the statutory period.7 In the Walton case8
the court said "to bar a recovery in ejectment by one who has title
to the premises the possessor is required to prove not only that his
possession was taken at the outset under a hostile claim but that such
hostility continued"; however, if the entry made by a person is not
hostile when he enters, the possession must then become hostile before
the Statute of Limitations will begin to run9 and once it is held hostilely
if continued for the statutory period it will ripen into a perfect title by
adverse possession.-o When the possession is not held adversely in its
inception, but held in harmony with that of the real or rightful owner's
title, the statute of limitations will not begin to run in the adverse
persons favor until there is a disclaimer and disavowal of the true
owner's title.11 This is also true where one is in possession of land
and is seeking the owner in order to purchase title, the statute of limitations does not and will not run until it is held adversely to that of the
owner's and for the statutory period.12 It is also true in the case of a
tenant who holds his title subservient to a paramount title, and he is
not an adverse possessorl3 unless the tenant claims the premises ad6

272, 1853.
Turney v. Chamberlain 15 Ill.
Rtigg v. Cook 4 Gim 336; 1847.
498 1856. These were earlier cases cited in suDport
McClellan v. Kellogg 17 Ill.
of the Jackson v. Berner case, supra.

7

Gildehaus v. Whiting 39 Kan 706; 18 P 916; 1888.
McDonald v. Fox 20 Nev. 364; 22 P 234 1889.
Mhoon v. Cain 77 Tex. 316; 14 S. W. 24; 1890.
Abbott v. Sturtevant 30 Me. 40 ; 1849.
Sommer v. Compton 96 P 124; (Or.) 1908.
Maxwell v. Cunningham 50 W. Va. 298; 40 S. E. 499; 1901.

8 Brandt ex dem. Walton v. Ogden 1 Johns 156 (N. Y.) 1806.
9

Johnston v. Albuquerque 12 N. H. 20; 72 P 9; 1903.

10

Hays v. Iemoine 156 Ala. 465; 47 So. 97; 1908.

11

Whitlock v. Johnson 87 Va. 323; 12 S. E. 614 ; 1891.
Virginia Midland 1. Co. v. Barbour 97 Va. 118; 83 S. E. 554; 1899.

12 Mhoon v. Cain 77 Tex 816; 14 S. W. 24; 1890.
13

Elmendorf v. Taylor 10 Wheat. 152; 6 L. Ed. 289; 1825.
Williams v. Morris 95, U. S. 444; 24 L. Ed. 360; 1877.
Goode v. Gaines 145 U. S. 141; 36 I. Ed. 654; 1891.
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versely as his own and the landlord is aware of his tenant's claim and
allows the tenant to stay in possession for the statutory period.14
So possession which is not hostile has no basis for title by adverse possession15 no matter how long continuedl6 or how exclusive it may be
in character.17
Now as to claim of right or color of title we see that it is also
essential for an adverse possessor to hold the land under a claim of
right or a color of titlel8 however, this is not true in some of the
states.19 In the Jasperson case2O the court stated that where one took
possession and occupied vacant land he is nothing more than a mere
squatter and as such does not work a dissession of the real owner, nor
would such possession by a squatter ripen into title, and that to have
or constitute adverse possession it must originate under a claim or color
of title having reference to some distinct source from which it is claimed
to have been deraigned. In Balch v. Smith2l the supreme court also
stated that the basis for adverse possession must be under a claim or
color of title, otherwise it would not ripen into title. This doctrine was

also affirmed in Blake v. Shiveor.22 Here the court said there must
be a decision of the original owner for there cannot be seisin at the
same time and that until there is a diseisin the statute of limitations
will not commence to run against the true owner, and to work a diseisin it must be under a claim of right or color of title.23 In the
14
15

Lea v. Netherton 9 yerg 315

(Tenn.) 1836.

Evert v. Tuner 184 Iowa 1253; 169 N. W. 625; 1918.
Ring v. Battle Creek Box Co. 235 Mich. 24. 209 N. W. 133; 1926.
Nelson v. Johnson 189 Ky. 815 226 S. W. 94; 1920.
Trimboli v. Kinkel 226 N. Y. 147; 123 N. E. 205; 1919.
Bank of Eagle v. Morrison 197 Wis. 40; 221 N. W. 383; 1928.
2 C. J. page 124 note 45, page 265, note 87.

16

Missouri Lumber Co. v. Chronister 259 S. W.

17

Dobbins v. Economic Gas Co. 182 Cal. 616; 189 P 1073; 1920.
See also 2 C. J. page 124 notes 49-51.

18

19

20

1042 (Mo.)

1924.

Jasperson v. Scharnikow 150 Fed. 571; 15 L. It A. (N.S) 1118; 1907.
Adams v. Pearce 218 Ala. 525; 119 So. 236; 1928.
Jacobi v. Jacobi 345 Ill. 518; 178 N. E. 88. 1931.
Town of Kaneville v. Meredith 351 Ill. 620; 184 N. E. 883; 1933.
Crismond v. Kendrick 825 Mo. 619; 29 S. W. (2d) 1100; 1930.
Smith v. Feneley 240 Mich. 439; 215 N. W. 853; 1927.
Green v. Trumbull 37 N. H. 604; 26 P (2d) 1079;
Honeyman v. Andrew 124 Old.. 18; 253 P 489; 1927.
Pocahontas Coal & Coke Co. v. Bower 111 W. Va. 112; 163 S. E. 421; 1932.
Fitschen Bros. Com. Co. v. Noyes' Estate 16 Mont. 175; 246 P. 713; 1926.
Chicago M. St. P. & P. R. Co. v. Cross 212 Iowa 218; 234 N. W. 569; 1931.
Ahern v. Travelers Ins. Co. 108 Conn. 1; 142 A 400; 1928.
Davis v. Biddle 89 Ind. App. 361; 166 N. E. 801; 1929.
Thurston v. Batchellor 100 Vt. 334; 137 A 199; 1927.
Jasperson v. Scharnikow 150 Fed. 571; 15 L. R. A. (N.S)

21 Balch v. Smith 4 Wash. 497; 30 P 648; 1892.
22

Blake v. Shriver 27 Wash 593; 68 P 330; 1902.

23

In

Yesler Estate v. Holmes 89 Wash 34; 80 P 851; 1905.

1178; 1907.
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Alsup case24 the court held the defendant not to be an adverse possessor even though he had complied with the statute25 by paying taxes
and holding possession for seven years, because the statute did not apply
to him for it was his duty as the mortgagor's successor to pay the taxes
and therefore he recognized title in another and to be an adverse possessor possession must be hostile and under a claim of title and not in
recognition of the title of the real owner and that he would not become
an adverse possessor until the purchase money was paid. In McDaniel
v. Sloss Iron and Steal Co.26 the court quoted Washburn on Real
Pr'operty27 wlhere it is stated that "where a party enters upon land and
takes possession, without claim of title or right his ocdupation is subservient to the paramount owner and not adverse to it." It is nothing
more than a trespass, and no matter how long continued can never
ripen into a good title.28 The Tyler case29 also held that possession
without claim of title was subservient to a paramount title and not
adverse to it. In a New York case a woman found an island in Westchester creek near New York City, unoccupied, entered upon it and
without claim or color of title, record or otherwise, and had erected
buildings and remained in possession for twenty years, the court held
that she was a mere squatter and consequently could not obtain title
by adverse possession.30 In the Jacobi case3l the court held that possession must be hostile and adverse and must be under a claim of
ownership and until this is shown the statute of limitations does not
run. And in the Frazier case32 it was held a claim of right, title or
ownership is essential and if such element is absent possession is deemed
subservient to the title of the record* owner and not adverse. If one
enters upon the land without color of title and then subsequently becomes adverse by acquiring and asserting a claim of title, the statute
of limitations will'then begin to run from the time of such assertion33
and will ripen into a good title.
Consequently the failure of A to hold the property hostilely and
under a claim of right or color of title for the statutory period, which
elements are necessary requirements in order for one to obtain title
by adverse possession, A, in our case, would not obtain title by adverse
possession by pleading the statute of limitations as against the true
owner B.
-Saeiio Alo ni
24 Alsup v. Stewart 194 Ill. 595; 62 N. U. 795 ,1902.
25 Seven years' payment of taxes, with color of title and possession.
III. Revised Statutes Chap 83 sec. 6; 1943.
26 McDaniel v. Sloss Iron & Steel Co. 152 Ala. 414; 44 So. 705; 1907.
27 3 Washburn on Real Property 4th ed. page 135-136.
28 Bernstein v. Humes 75 Ala. 241; 1883.
Dothard v. Denson 72 Ala 641; 1882.
29 Harvey v. Tyler 69 U. S. (2 Wall) 328; 17 L. Ed. 871; 1865.
30 In re city of NY 63 Hun 630; 18 N. Y. Supp. 82; 1892.
31 Jacobi v. Jacobi 346 Il. 518; 178 N. E. 88; 1931.
82 Frazier v. Banks 294 Ky 61; 170 S. W. (2d) 900; 1943.
83 Weckham v. Henthorn 91 Iowa 242; 59 N. W. 276; 1894. ,
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BALANCE OF CONVENIENCE DOCTRINE.-This paper will present the

general rule and the prevailing rule in Indiana with reference to the
balance of convenience doctrine. This doctrine seems to be mainly concerned with cases wherein the complainant is seeking to enjoin some
large industry from operating due to the latter's obnoxious operations.
The defendant contends that the resulting injuries must be balanced by
the court, and that, where the hardship inflicted upon one party by the
granting of an injunction would be very much greater than that which
would be suffered by the other party if the nuisance were permitted to
continue, injunctive relief should be denied. This substantially covers the
type of case brought under the balance of convenience doctrine.
The court applied this rule in Grey et r'el Simmonset al v. Mayor of
City of Patersonl in a case which grew out of a nuisance. Here the city
maintained a system of sewers which discharged its contents into the
Passaic River. This pollution constituted a nuisance and the riparian
landowners sought an injunction to stop this pollution and thus save
their property from pollution. However, the injunction was denied and
the court held that by reason of the great injury which would fall upon
the city by restraining the continuous use of its sewage system, and the
acquiescence of the riparian owners above where the tide flows, their injury being comparatively small, it would be inequitable to grant them
an injunction.
But what of this great injury to the cityl It seems that the city had
gone to great expense in establishing this system of sewers. The system
accommodated over 100,000 people. If this restraint were granted the
homes of these hundred thousand people would be rendered perilous to
health and life and unfit for occupancy. Thus, due to these facts the injunction was vacated.
The legal determination of the balance of convenience doctrine can
be divided into four categories:
1. Decisions definitely favoring the doctrine and large industries.
2. Decisions involving a case wherein the industries have done all
they can to stop the offending operations and wherein said injunction
will not be granted due to the diligence of the industry.
3. Decisions definitely favoring the plaintiff wherein the injunction
will be granted.
4. Decisions involving cases wherein the industries have done all
they can toward stopping the offending operations but have failed, and
due to this failure an injunction-will be granted despite their efforts.
Under the first category we find the case of Bliss v. Anaconda Coppew Refining Co.2 Here it seems that complainant owner of a farm
brought suit to enjoin the maintenance and operation by defendant of a
smelter on the ground that the fumes and arsenic precipitated from the
smoke from the smelter injured the crops and poisoned the stock thereon.
The smelter was built at a cost of nearly ten million dollars and treated
1
2

45 At]. 995, 60 N. J. Eq. 385, (1900).
167 Fed. 342 (1909).
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7,000 tons of ore per day. Its production of copper was from 17% to
20% of that produced in the United States. The livelihood of a great
number of people depended on the operation of this company for it was
one of the main industries. Thus the injunction was not granted for the
gain of the plaintiff would be entirely disproportionate to the loss of the
defendant if this company was enjoined.
Likewise, in the case of Madison v. Ducktoum Sulphur Copper and
Iron Co.3 we have a similar decision. Defendant caused to emit large
volumes of smoke which settled upon the surrounding territory and rendered the homes of tthe complainants less comfortable. The court refused
to enjoin defendant from operating and held that such a decree would
cause thousands of people to lose their homes and starve, and the loss
would be disproportionate to the gain of plaintiff.
Tennessee has a statute which authorizes the application of the
balance of convenience doctrine. Thus in Tennessee it is merely a matter
of determining whether the doctrine is applicable, and large industries
are very definitely favored. To further this point, it is found that some
states have passed statutes which seem to authorize the application of
the balance of conveniencedoctrine. We will find such statutes in Colorado,4 Georgia,5 and Tennessee.6
Under the second point, McCarthy v. Bunker Hill Mining Company 7
very aptly presents a good example. This mining company, through
operations, rendered impure the water of the river, which, when it overflowed, poisoned and injured the riparian landowners' land. They sought
an injunction restraining defendants from operating. The court refused
to grant the injunction. The owners did all they could to prevent injury
to others by the construction of dams, etcetera. The injunction would
have closed mines in which ten to twelve thousand men were employed
and in which large capital was invested. Due to this great loss and the
fact that the gain of plaintiff would have been out of proportion to the
loss of defendant if the injunction had been granted, the injunction was
denied.
Some decisions favor the landowners despite the hardship inflicted
upon the industries. Such is the situation in the following cases. In
Welton V. DJ East Oak Street Building Corporation8 a zoning law

violated by constructing a building too close to the alley. The court held
that the building had to be set back despite the cost. The "balance of
convenience" doctrine was not followed here for the health and comfort
of the public was involved. Defendant in Whalen V. Union Bag and
Paper Company 9 owned and operated a pulp mill on a stream. Plaintiff's
land was located down the stream which was very unsanitary due to
8 88 S. W. 658 113 Tenn. 331 (1904).
4 Ann. Stat. Colorado 1912, Sec. 8241.
5

Parks Ann. Code Georgia, 1914, Sec. 5497.

6 Ann. Code Tennessee, 1918. Sec. 5188.
7 147 Fed. 981 (1906).
8

70 F. 2d. 377 (1934).
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pollution by defendant. Despite the fact that the defendant had expended
great sums in building his factory and *ould suffer heavily if enjoined,
he was enjoined from polluting the stream. The balance of convenience
doctrine ig not usually followed where the health of the public is in
danger.
In Weston Paper Company v. Pope 10 large concerns polluted a
stream to the detriment of riparian land owners. They were enjoined
despite their heavy loss, for they should have foreseen such a condition
would develop. In Kenyon v. Edmundson 11 defendant's desiccating plant
gave forth very obnoxious odors which were very offensive to residents
of that vicinity and interfered with their comfort and the enjoyment of
their homes. Defendant was enjoined from operating despite the fact
that he would stand to lose heavily. He was given a chance to operate
without such odors but he was unable to so perform.
From reading the above cases, it is quite apparent that equity will
do its utmost to protect the health and safe living of individual landowners. Equity holds the unrestricted enjoyment of one's land high as
a precious right of landowners.
Finally under point four where industry is given a chance to protect itself we have the case of Hulbert v. California Portland Cement
Co.12 Defendant here manufactured cement nearly two miles from a
city and had expended great sums in the construction of the building.
It gave off certain dust and smoke which ruined plaintiff's fruit trees
and acted as a nuisance. Defendant earnestly did his best to avoid giving
off such products but had failed. Defendant was enjoined despite his
great loss in buildings, etcetera.
This case presents a very inclusive definition of this doctrine now
before us. It states that where the hardship inflicted upon one party
by the granting of an injunction would be very much greater than that
which would be suffered by the other party if the nuisance were permitted to continue, injunctive relief should be denied. This doctrine is
known as the "balance of hardship."
Let us now proceed to determine the trend of decisions in Indiana
concerning this doctrine. As the result of exhaustive research, I found
that the earlier decisions definitely favored the landowners, but with
the industrialization of Indiana came the swing of balance of favor
over to the industrial side.
Some of the earlier cases to be presented will clear the picture of
this early trend in Indiana as to whether the landowners or large industries were favored. In Bowers v. Indianapolis13 it was declared that a
municipal ordinance declaring emission of black smoke from a factory
9 101 N. E. 805, 208 N. Y. 1 (1913).
10

155 Ind. 394 57 N. E. 719 (1900).

11

193 Pac. 739, 79 OkM.313 (1920).

12

38 L. 1. A. N. S. 436, 118 Pac. 928, 161 Cal. 239 (1911).

13

169 Ind. 105 81, N.'E. 1097 (1907).
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a nuisance is not void. Reichert v. Geers 14 declared that a slaughter
house in use in a populous part of a city is a nuisance and may be
enjoined. Over v. Dehne15 decided that the operation of a foundry for
more than twenty years at the same location does not give the owner
a prescriptive right to maintain it when it becomes dangerous and a
nuisance to enjoyment of plaintiff's land.
In Niagara Oil Company v. Ogle 16 where the productive power of
land has been destroyed by reason of the existence of a nuisance, a recovery for permanent injury to the land is authorized although such
nuisance can be abated. Cleveland C.C. and St. L. Ry. Co. v. King 17
decided that where the acts complained of in an action for damages to
plaintiff's property and the comfortable enjoyment thereof consisted of
defendant's casting into a large pond near her premises carloads of dirt
and offensive material, causing thereby the water to become foul and
poisonous, the nuisance was one which could be abated.
Now let us turn our attention to a recent case which presents what
seems to be the prevailing opinion today in Indiana. In Owen v.
Phillipa 8 which is a rather early case, the court seems to indicate the
'initial point of shifting of views. It held that courts interfere, by injunction, against establishments such as mills and manufactories, with
great caution, and only in cases where the facts are weighty and important, and the injury complained of is serious and permanent in character.
In 1935, as mentioned above, we have the case of Northern Indiana
Public Service Co. v. W. T. and M. S. Veasey,19 which is an atcion by
the owner of greenhouses against owner of an adjacent gas plant for
damages for property injury resulting from the emission of poisonous
gases, etcetera, for an injunction. The court found that the gas plant
'could not be operated in such a manner as not to emit the poisonous
gases, or in such manner as not to injure plaintiff's plants and flowers,
and that it would be of less damage to permit the gas company to con-tinue its operation than to enjoin it, and held that it followed that
the gas plant might continue operating in he same manner forever. If
he plaintiff suffered a total loss of property and business they could not
enjoin, but could recover damages due to such continuous operation.
After reading the above decision, the present position of large industries in Indiana becomes clear. By "industries" we refer to those native
to the Calumet region, namely, the Standard Oil Company of Indiana,
Carbon and Carbide Company, Federated Metals, lever Brothers, American Maize, et al. Obvious property damage has resulted to residents
of that area as a result of the operation of these and other industries.
Inhabitants have inhaled the stench, and have borne the smoke and
14 98 Ind. 73 (1884).
15 38 Ind. App. 427 75 N. E. 664, 76 N. E. 883 (1906).
16 177 Ind. 292 98 N. E. 60 (1912).

17 23 Ind. App. 573 55 N. E. 875 (1900).
1'873 Ind. 284 (1881).
19 210 Ind. 338 400 X. E. 620 (1936).
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excess gases for years. Paint has been peeled from homes due to the
acid element in the smoke from a certain chemical plant. Neighboring
residents to an asphalt works along a highway are subject to coughing
spasms due to odors emitted from this plant. Smoke from these industries at times obscures vision so that traffic is almost completely halted.
Bathing water in Lake Michigan is sometimes covered with a film of oil
as a result of deposits of excess oil poured into the lake by certain refineries. Youngsters have been seen to break out with sores as the result"of
this impure condition of the waters. These and many more can be seen,
but the most tragic effect is seen in the pale and unhealthy appearance
of the small children of this region. Life itself seems to be demanded
as a sacrifice on the altar of industrialization. A typical example of this
situation is in the case of the Standard Oil Company of Indiana which
owns 5,688,911 acres outside of Whiting, Indiana. It's output is 103,000
bbls. per day, and its gross operating income in 1942 was $458,167,052.
Shares outstanding amount to 15,284,892 shares. It employs 33,113
persons.20
The East Chicago bhanch of the American Steel Foundries produces
24,740 tens of steel castings per year. It has 56 buildings and 331,132
square feet of floor space.21
The Hammond branch has 29 buildings and 319,350 square feet of
floor space. It produces 33,500 tons of brakes, etcetera per year.22
Thus it can be seen from these facts that if these industries were
enjoined they would stand to lose very heavily as would the whole
region. So it is generally felt that it is better to follow the balance
of convenience doctrine in a region wherein large industries predominate, despite the hardships of the surrounding populace, who are in a
sense of the word, the minority.
Despite this rather apparent dark picture for the landowners of this
region, there are indications that relief might soon be available to them.
Not long ago the South Bend chapter of the Natinal Assciatin of Power
Engineers discussed the necessity of cooperation between city officials,
industrial heads and power engineers to bring about adequate smoke
control and told the engineers that their work in South Bend on the
problem is expected to set an example for the rest of the State. Proposed
ordinances to control the smoke nuisance are being prepared by a threeman committee.
Other industrial leaders are undertaking to cooperate with civic leaders to correct this intolerable situation by agreeing to take all possible
precautions to eliminate nuisances created by the operations of their
plants. Thus industrial concerns who have enjoyed the benefits of the
"balance of convenience" doctrine will, it seems, voluntarily undertake
to compensate in some manner for the injuries suffered by neighboring
residents to their plants which are not actionable in court because of
this doctrine.
-William J. Obermiller.
20 Moody's Reports.
21 Moody's Reports.

22 Moody's Reports.

NOTES
FIREMEN AS PUBLIC OFFICERS OR EMPLOYEES. -

Plaintiff was a fire-

man in the defendant city, and plaintiff was paid a set salary under
Ordinance 1457 of the city. Also, there was an allowance given to each
fireman of not more than one hundred and twenty dollars for each year
for the purpose of purchasing uniforms and caps. Subsequently Ordinance 1694 was passed which reduced the salaries of firemen for the
year starting April 1, 1934. Plaintiff accepted this reduced salary and
also has been forced to purchase his uniforms and caps at his own
expense.1 Plaintiff alleges that he was appointed to the fire department
in 1933 for a five year term at a fixed annual salary, and that said
fixed salary has been reduced $16.25 per month for which the plaintiff
sought to recover. Plaintiff, also, sought to recover the expenditures
which he has made for uniforms and caps on the theory that the defendant had been unjustly enriched and should be -held accountable on
quasi contract. Defendant answered pleading Ordinance 1694 and estoppel of the plaintiff to recover. The lower court struck from the answer
the defense of estoppel and acquiescence to the claim of salary reduction on the theory that Ordinance 1694 was an amendment or revision
of the 1926 Ordinance 1698 and that the amending ordinance did not
comply with section 5715 Code 1939 which provided:2 "No ordinance
shall contain more than one subject which shall be clearly expressed in
its title. An ordinance revising or amending an ordinance or section
thereof shall specifically repeal the ordinance or section amended or
revised, and set forth in full the ordinance or section as amended or
revised," and therefore ordinance 1694 was invalid. Also, the lower
court pointed out that the firemen were not estopped by accepting a
lower salary. Also, the lower court struck the defense of estoppel to the
claim that money expended for uniforms and caps without a protest or
demand for reimbursement. The court held this alone was not sufficient
to constitute an estoppel. The supreme court sustained the latter ruling
but overruled the former holding, saying that even though the ordinance
1694 was inoperative because of non-compliance with ordinance 5715,
nevertheless, the firemen is estopped to claim a right to back salary because he accepted the former salary without protest, and thus he is
barred from bringing the present claim.
It is the purpose of this comment to show the legal status of firemen
as developed by the court in other jurisdictions; and also to point out
some general principles in regard to the proper procedure for amending and revising ordinances.
In regard to the proper procedure for changing an existing ordinance it has been said, "Express repeals can only be effected by an act
of equal grade with that by which the ordinance was originally put in
1 Glaser v. City of Burlington, 1 N. W. 2d 709 (1942).
2 Code, 1939, §5715 provides: 'o
ordinance shall contain more than one suhject,
which shall be clearly expressed in its title. An ordinance revising or amending an ordinance or section thereof shall specifically repeal the ordinance or section amended or
revised, and set forth in full the ordinance or section as amended or revised." (In the
1934 Ordinance 1694 no mention was made to Ordinances 1498 and 1457 which Ordinance
1694 revised and amended.)
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operation. No part or feature of an existing ordinance can be changed
by a mere resolution of the council even though signed by the mayor and
recorder. A new ordinance must be passed.'3 This general principle has
found favor in many jurisdictions.4 It has also been held a defect in an
existing ordinance can not be cured or amended by a motion of the
council; rather a new ordinance must be passed which cures the defect.5
Thus, generally, it may be said that to change an existing ordinance one
must conform to the same procedure and pass legislation of the same
force and effect of the originial ordinance.6 This is illustrated in G. W.
Mart v. City of G'innell where an ordinance prescribes a set salary this
salary can not be subsequently changed by a resolution.7 Swindell v.
State develops the rule that where an act was done under an ordinance,
even though it could have originally been enacted by resolution alone,
nevertheless a subsequent change must be-made by an ordinance and a
resolution will not have the effect to amend, revise, or overrule the former ordinance.8 In the case of Murphy v. Gilman it was held that a
fireman's salary could be changed by resolution alone and no new ordinance was necessary.9 In this case they refused to follow the ordinance
and designated the firemen's salary by resolution. But, it is conceded
that the council could prescribe the firemen's salary either by resolution
or by ordinance. This rule has now been changed in Iowa and firemen's
salaries must be by ordinance.1O
Generally, it may be said where an ordinance is used in the first
instance any subsequent change to said ordinance can not be by resolution or motion, but it may only be accomplished by another valid ordinance of equal force.11
When is a person an officer and when is one an employee? This
question has created some interesting distinctions by the courts. One
authority, -namely Judge Cooley, makes a fine distinction between an
employer and a public officer when he says, "An office is a special trust
or charge created by competent authority. If not merely honorary, certain duties will be connected with it, the performance of which will be
the consideration for its being conferred upon a particular individual,
who for the time will be the officer. The officer is distinguished from the
employer in the greater importance, dignity and independence of his
8 Horr and B., Mun. Pol. Ord. §61.
4 Jones v. McAlpine, 64 Ala. 511 (1879); Homer v. Rowley, 51 Ia. 620. 2 N.W.
486 (1879) ; Campbell v. City of Cincinnati, 49 0. S. 463, 31 N. E. 606 (1892) ; City of

Loganasport v. Crockett, 64 Ind. 819 (1878). Also see: Dillon, Municipal Corporation, §291.
5 Bills v. City of Goshen, 117 Ind. 221, 20 N. E. 115 (1889).

6 Jones v.-McAlpine, 64 Ala. 511 (1879).
7 187 N.W. 471, 194 I. 499 (1922).
8 148 Ind. 153 (1895).

9 Murphy v. Gilman, 204 Ia. 58, 214 N. W. 679 (1927). See Also Footnote 10.
10 Iowa Code, §6519 (1939).

11 2 McQuillan, Mn. Corps. 2d Ed., p. 348. 43 C. J. 564.
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position; in being required to take an oath, and perhaps to give an official bond; in the liability to be called to account as a public offender for
misfeasance or nonfeasance in office, and usually, though not necessarily,
in the tenure of his position. In particular cases other distinctions will
appear which are not general."12 Also. in Shelby v. Alcorn13 the court
says, "It may be stated as universally true that where an employment
or duty is a continuing one, which is defined by rules prescribed by law
and not by contract, such a charge or employment is an office and the
person who performs it is an officer." Similar definitions have been given
by other courts.14
But, into what classification does the fireman fall? Is a fireman a
public officer or an employee? Also, of what legal consequence is it
whether the fireman is an employee or a public officer?
The state of New York,- by legislation has rather consistently
held firemen to be public officers. The case of Padden v. City of New
York held a fireman was a city officer, and where the fireman was wrongfully discharged and accepted a job as an employee in another branch
of the city government his earnings as an employee can not be set-off
against what is owed him as fireman on the theory that one can not hold
two public offices at the same time.15 In another case where the Fire
Marshal took an oath and the statute designated the Fire Marshal as
a public officer, the court held that the intent was to have the Fire
Marshal a public officer and not an employee and the court so held.16
Also, in another instance where the Fire Marshal was designated by
statute to be a public offiter, it was held he could not be removed without cause, and his liabilities and rights were to be ascertained from the
statute creating the public office.17
Wisconsin by statute has also held, firemen to be public officers, and
as such the court held tlat their salary can not be reduced during their
tenure of office. Even if.they attempt to contract away their right to
their salary they are not estopped to later recover the salary prescribed
by statute. The court went on to say, ".

.

. where the law, as in this case,

prohibits a municipality from meddling, during an officer's term of office,
with the compensation he will receive for his services, the doctrine of
estoppel cannot be invoked to thwart it. . . ."18 Another casel9 holds
12 Throop v. Langdon, 40 Mich. 673 (1879).
13 86 Miss. 273, 72 Am.Dec. 169 (1858).
14 Bunu v. People, 45 Il. 897 (1867); People v. Loaefler, 175 E]1.
585, 51 N.F. 785
(1898) ; State v. Spaulding; 102 Ia. 639, 72 N.W. 288 (1897).
15 92 N. Y. S. 926, 45 Misc. Rep. 517 (1904).
16 People v. Scannel, 49 N. Y. S.1096, 22 Misc. lep. 298 (1898).
17 In re Freeman, 50 N.Y.S. 520, 27 App. Div. 593 (1898).
18 Nelson v. City of Superior, 109 Wis. 618, 85 N.W. 412 (1901). Also see: Clarke
v. County of Milwaukee, 53 Wis. 65, 9 N.W. 782 (1881).
19 Jackson v. Wilde, 198 P. 822, 52 Cal. App. 259 (1921).
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that a fireman is an officer and not an employee and as an officer his
salary cannot be altered during tenure of office. The court says, "Plaintiff's title to the office of fireman is not disputed. To that office the law
attaches a monthly salary, and to that salary he is entitled so long as
the law creating it remains in force and he continues to hold the office."
Also, in Pennsylvania in a 1941 case a fireman is held to be a public
officer.20 But, another Pennsylvania case held that if a fireman was a
de facto officer acting in bad faith he can not recover even on quantum
meruit. However, where one in good faith renders services under the
impression that he is a legal officer he may recover for work labor and
services.21 Where a fireman lied about his age he cannot recover for
services.22
In Smiddy -v. City of Memphis the court found that a fireman by
accepting the old salary had not waived his right to a higher salary
prescribed by legislative act. This would tend to show that the fireman
is regarded as a public officer for under the same circumstances the
employee of the city'would be estopped to claim the higher salary.23 But,
in other cases it has been held that a fireman can contract away his
right to higher salary, and his subsequent claim for his original salary
is barred as the contract is valid as a matter of policy.2 4 This conclusion
would tend to prove that the fireman is an employee; for it has been
held with good authority that an officer of a city cannot contract away
his right to his salary.25 However, in the case of Barfield v. City of
Athens is was held that where a city fireman's written acknowledgment
on the back of his pay check that check was in full payment of salary
due him and that deductions were made at the payee's request the fireman had waived his right to higher wages.26 This again tends to show
that the fireman is regarded as an employee rather than an officer.
There are many cases which hold unquestionably that a fireman is
an employee and not a public officer.27 Also, it was held without question in State v. Jennings28 that a fireman employed by the council under
a city ordinance are not public officers, but employees of the city.
The case of Schmitt v. Martin Dooling while admitting that firemen
are not public officers, nevertheless, hold that firemen should not be
20

Gerson v. City of Philadelphia, 20 A. 2d 283 (1941).

21 Lauzerene Township v. Fayette County, 330 Pa. 247, 199 A. 327 (1938).
22

Commonwealth v. Thomas, 328 Pa. 19, 195 A. 103 (1938).

23 203 S.W. 512 (1918).
24

Gamble v. City of Sacramento, 110 P. 2d 530

(1941) ; City of Fort Worth v.

Morrison, 151 S. W. 2d 300 (1941).
25 Van Gilder v. Madison, 267 N.W. 25 (1936).
26 187 S.E. 407 (1936) ; Jones v. Winnebago County, 5 N.E. 2d 862 (1937).
27 State v. Johnson, 123 Mo. 43, 27 S.W. 399 (1894).
28

57 O.S. 415, 49 N.E. 404, 63 Am. St. Rep. 723 (1898).
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allowed to assign their unearned salary. The basis for this ruling is on
the theory that the firemen are performing a public function and an
assignment of their unearned income might tend to lessen their efficiency
in their public (offe and consequently such an assignment is against
9
public policy.2
There seems to be a definite split of authority in regard to the validity of an agreement by an officer or employee to accept less compensation
than that provided by law. One authority says: "acceptance of a less
sum than that allowed by law, as salary or compensation, without objection, and in full satisfaction for services rendered will ordinarily estop
the officer or employee from claiming more."30 A recent case expresses
this opinion.31 However, many other recent cases hold an officer or employee is not estopped to recover back salary because the officer or
employee accepted a lesser sum as payment.32
Some of the recent cases tend to hold firemen are public officers and
as such are entitled to the privileges and immunities of other public
officers.33 In the case of Jackson County v. Reed34 it was held that an
agreement to accept less compensation than that provided by law was
unenforceable as against public policy. Another case35 holds that where
firemen worked more than required they are not estopped to receive
extra compensation.
Thus, it would seem to be the better rule that firemen are officers of
a city rather than employees. However, there is a split of authority on
the point as the cases illustrate; and it seems pertinent to point out that
for more clarity on the point there should be legislation on the legal
status of firemen to avoid further confusion by the courts decisions.
James H. Neu
29 145 Ky. 240, 140 S.W. 197, 57 L. P. A. (N.S.) 775 (1911).
30 2 McQuillan, Mun. Corps., 2d ed. 249. §542.
31 Maxwell v. City of Madison, 292 N.W. 301 (1940) ;Van Houghten v. City of
Eaglewood, 12 Atl. 2d 668 (1940).
32 Reed v. Jackson County, 142 S.W. 2d 862 (1940) ; Steck v. Bd. of Ed. of City of
Camden (1940).
33 Morgan v. City of Rockford, 31 N.E. 2d 596 (1940).
34 142 S.W. 2d 862 (1941).
85 City of Galveston v. 0 Mara, 146 S. W. 2d 416 (1941).
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THE MODERN LEASE: CONTRACT OR CONVEYANcE.-The question of
construing a leasehold either as a contract, that is as personalty,
or as a conveyance, or realty is one that has been constantly before
the courts and one which has undergone significant statutory changes
occasioned by our complex economic life. The distinction between an
interest in land that is personalty and one that is realty is one of historical origin. There seems no question that at common law a leasehold
interest whether for one of 100 years, was a chattel real and was
denominated personal property. So fundamental was this idea in the
English courts and so well preserved did it pass to some American jurisdictions that we find in Lenow v. Fores, the court declaring: "No proposition has been better settled from the earliest days of the common law
than than a lease of whatever duration is but a chattel."1

This common law concept of construing leases as personalty seems
due to the fact that when a lessee, possessing anything less than an
estate of a freehold character, was ejected from the land by. the lessor
he could not assert a property right to reclaim his interest, but his
action was analogous to an action in contract, his only remedy being a
personal action for damages. In 1235 the action of quare ejecit was
created for the amelioration of the lessee and by the end of the 13th century, with the establishment of the actions of trespass quare clausw.m
fregit and trespass de ejectione firmae, the lessee for years could assert
a possessory right to reclaim the property when he had been wrongfully
evicted as judicially powerful as that of a holder of a freehold.
A lease has been defined in Blackstone as "properly a conveyance of
any lands or tenements, made for life, for years or at will, but alwa*s
for a less time than the lessor hath in the premises; for it be for the
whole interest, it is more properly an assignment than a lease."2
Further looking into the matter, we find that "Teffany describes a
lease as they say 'in a more extended sense to describe not only the
legal act (the conveyance) by which a lessor estate is vested in another,
but in addition, the legal act or acts by which various contractural obligations are created in connection with such conveyances."3
It is not surprising that quite frequently the courts have lost sight
of the fact that the really essential part of the transaction is a conveyance, and instead regard it as involving the creation of contractual obligations only, frequently speaking of the "contract -of lease."
"The failure for many today to recognize that lease is something
more than a mere contract," says chief Baron Gilbert, "is, it is conceived to a considerable extent due to the fact ... for the possession and
profits of lands on one side, and a recompense by rent or other consideration on the other."4
1 Lenow v. Fones, 4 S. W. 56, 48 Ayk. 557 (1887).
2 2 Blacks'itne's Commentaries 317.
3 Tiffany's Landord and Tenant, p. 159.
4 Bac. Abr. Tit. Leases, p. 433.
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This rule was accepted in many cases frequently upon the express
authority of the writer referred to.5
Fundamental objection to such a definition of a lease is that it
entirely ignores the common law theory of a particular and a reversionary estate in the lessee and lessor respectively and substitutes therefor
the civil law conception of a contract of hiring, which passes no title or
property in the thing hired, but merely binds the owner to secure the
enjoyment of the thing to-the hirer.
Corpus Juris says, "The word 'lease' is used in various senses. It
is sometimes applied to the term or estate created sometimes to be written evidence of the term or estate and again to the demise or conveyance by which the tenure or estate is created. A lease for the term of
years is chattel real, and is regarded as an encumbrance on the leased
land.6
This is further shown in the case of Mayberry v. Johnson7 which
stated, "A written lease for more than three years signed by the party
making it, though not under seal, is good and valid under the Statute
of Frauds and can no more be turned into a lease at will, than it can be
assigned or surrendered by parol.
Further quoting from Corpui Juris, it states concerning a lease as
a contract, that "the word lease is frequently used to designate the
contract by which the relation of landlord and tenant is created .and
has been defined as a species of contract for the possession and profits
of land and tenements, either for life, or for a certain period of time, or
during the pleasure of the parties, and as a contract for the possession
and profits of land, for a determinate period with the recompense of
rent. The essentials of a contract must be present, and the lease is
governed by rules which govern contracts generally.
This rule was set out in the following cases: Thomas v. West Jersey
R. Co.8 and U. S. v. Gratiat.9
Corpus Juris continues by defining as a conveyance by saying "a
lease is generally regarded as a conveyance or grant of an estate in
real property for a limited term with conditions attached and in this
connection has been defined as a conveyance to a person for life or
years, or at will, in consideration of a return of rent or other recompense and as a conveyance of any lands or tenements usually in consideration of rent or other annual recompense, made for life, for years,
or at will, but always for a less time than the lessor has in the premises.
This was found in the case of Chittem v. Gassett,i0 where a lease
was defined as properly a conveyance of a particular estate in lands
for life, or for years, or at will where reversion is left in the grantor.
5 U. S. v. Gratiat, 10 Law. Ed. 673 (1840).
Heywood v. Fulmer, 158 Ind. 658 (1892).
Paul v. Cragnay, 69 Pac. 857, 25 Nev. 293 (1900).
6 85 Corpis Juris 1139.
7 15 W. J. L. 116 (1835).
8 101 U. S. 78 (1879).
9 14 Pet. 526 (1840).
10 148 Ark. 654 (1921).
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The opinions on whether a lease is a contract or a conveyance vary
from state to state. American Jurisprudence states it thus, "A lease is
both an executory contract and a present conveyance. It creates a privity
of contract and a privity of estate. Again as ordinarily employed, the
word 'lease' implies a term and a reversion to the owner of the land
after its termination and only a chattel interest passes thereunder.11
In Ohio, it is the general rule that a lease for a term of less than
three years is a contract and that all leases for a term longer than three
years must be attested, acknowledged or recorded, which would make
the lease a conveyance.12
This Ohio rule is backed up by the case of People's Building, Loan &
Savings Co. v. McIntir'e,13 where the court decided that "The option
provided in the lease for four consecutive years must be held to be 'an
interest in real property' and would bring the lease within Section 8510
Ohio General Code requiring acknowledgment and attestation of the
same."
We may then come to the conclusion that if a lease is a contract as
held to be in Ohio, when the contract is broken, action can be brought
immediately against the person breaking the contract. However, when
a lease is a conveyance, you must wait until the termination of the
lease or conveyance before you can bring any action for a breach of the
lease.
A Pennsylvania court, in deciding Townsend v. Boyd, states: "A
leasehold interest is not real estate, but merely a chattel real which is
personal property."14
In other jurisdictions the question has undergone striking legislative
evolution, and courts have been forced, by various acts of the legislature, to do a judicial "about-face" and declare certain types of leases
real property rather than personal property. Michigan courts, following the dictates of the legislature, declare certain types of leases real
property rather than personality. Any lease for a period of time longer
than three years is declared to be real property and consequently is
governed by the rules of real property. Other states make no specifications but unequivocally state that any interest in land less than a
freehold is real property. The Oregon Code provides: "The terms,
'land,' 'real estate,' and 'real property' as used in this act shall be construed to include the land itself, * * * all buildings, * * * and improvements erected thereon belonging or in any wise appertaining;
also any estate, right, title or interest whatever in land or real property
less than the fee simple."15
A Colorado statute declares: "The words 'land' or 'lands' and the
words 'real estate' shall be construed to include lands, tenements, and
hereditaments, and all rights thereto and all interest therein."16 Colorado courts, apparently following closely the intent of their legislature,
11
12

82 Amer. Jur. 28.
Ohio General Code, Sec. 8510 and 8517.

13

14 Ohio App. 28 (1846).

14
15

Townsend v. Boyd, 12 ]. R. A. N.
Oregon Code, Sec. 69-102.

16

Colorado Gen. Statutes, See. 3141; 2 Mills Ann. St. Sec. 4185.

S. 1148, 66 Atl. 1099, 217 Pa. 886 (1907).
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declare categorically: "In this state leases of land for a term of years
are regarded as real estate instead of personalty.17"
Besides these two jurisdictions, one that retains the common law
view of construing leases as personalty and the other, because of statutory evolution, holding any interest in land as realty, there is another
view that some courts have adopted. A view that, while remaining
cognizant of the original common law interpretation of a lease as personalty, has frequently conveniently construed leases to be real property
for reasons that we shall discuss later. In the famed, Fidelity Trust
v. Wayne County,18 the court said: "* * * However, it (a lease) is in
fact, as generally understood, an interest in real property, and while
for the general purposes of the law it retains its common law classification, courts and legislatures frequently treat it as included in real
property."
An Illinois court, in deciding Chicago v. University of
Chicago, declared: "Although a lease is considered at common law a
chattel real the legislature may, nevertheless, regard it as real property
and render it taxable as such."19
The subtle distinctions that courts have been called upon to make in
the adjudication of property cases takes on added importance because of
our complex taxation program. Indeed, one of the most important consequences of having a lease construed as real rather than personal properay can be traced directly to taxation. In Fidelity Trust Co. v. Wayne
County Supra, the court, in approving the levying of taxes of a mortgage
on a leasehold interest said: "A mortgage on leasehold interest for 99
years held to be mortgage on real property within meaning of mortgage
tax statute, and therefore subject to tax therein imposed, since words
'real property' are equivalent to 'real estate' which, includes an interest
in land and an estate for years is an 'interest in land' for this purpose."
In Chicago v. University of Chicago, Supra, the court in rather unequivocalterms tell that a lease can be regarded as real property and "is
taxable as such." In De Wyne v. Lewis,20 a New Jersey court summarized the present status of a lease when it declared: "That a term for
years while denominated a chattel real is not in strict legal accuracy
considered real estate but, on the contrary, is considered personal property whether the duration is for one or 99 years. At common law chattels real were considered personal property. In the state of New Jersey
our courts have considered chattels real or leasehold interest personal
property for many purposes. Courts in construing the law, must in order
to discover the legislative intent look to statutory language in its application to the subject. It is the determination -of this court that while
leaseholds, in the past, have been considered as personal property for
many purposes, in the matter of taxation it has been the practice to consider them as real property."
-Thomas F. Bremer.
-Francis J. Paulson.
17 Bonfils v. McDonald, 270 Pac. 650, 84 Colo. 825 (1928).
18 244 Mich. 182, 221 N. W. 11 (1928).
19 802 Ill.
455, 134 N. E. 723, 23 A. L. R. 244 (1922).
20 139 Ati. 434, 5 N. J. Misc. Rep. 948 (1927).
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MODIFICATION IN THE SALE OF REALTY.-Sales in

gross may be

divided into various subordinate classes: First, sales strictly and essentially by the tract, without reference to a definite quantity of acres.
Second, those sales where the acreage is only made in a descriptive manner Where the parties are willing to chance that the land might fall
short of or exceed the estimation. Third, the sale by the acre where
almost perfect exactness is striven for by the parties. Fourth, sales in
gross which are actually sales by the acre as understood by the parties.
The first two divisions will not stand modification under the general
rules of the several states, to illustrate, if there have been no fraudulent acts on the part of the parties, but in the latter two divisions
equitable relief will be granted unless previously waived or forfeited by
conduct of the party sustaining the loss.
The first two types of sales are usually found to bear the words,
"more or less" in the instrument of conveyance and the courts of the
several states have expressed their opinion as to the use of these words
in some of the cases herein cited.
The Kentucky courts in the case of Adkins v. Osborne 3. said, "in an
action to recover .part of money payed for land under mistake as to the
quantity, if the sales are made by the acre compensation for the discrepancy, no matter how small, will be allowed, but if the sale is in
gross the rule is that the deficit must be as much as ten per cent
before the complaining party is entitled to relief except where the sale
is strictly and essentially by the tract or where a supposed quantity by
estimation is mentioned or referred to in the land contract only for
the purpose of description."
The Louisiana courts have held that the words "more or less," when
used in a deed are words of safety and precaution and are intended to
cover some slight or unimportant inaccuracy in the frontage, depth,
or quantity in the land conveyed, but the words are never used for the
purpose of covering serious discrepancies or major inaccuracies, and
where the words will enable an adjustment to the imperative demands
or fixed monuments, they do not warrant or destroy the indicative of
distance when no other guides are furnished." 2
As the Louisiana court has shown in the foregoing paragraph the
use of the words in modification will not take an effect on a serious
misrepresentation and the doctrine of mistake will permit reformation,
but let us look into the courts of the other states where the learned
justices have decided cases on this same point and see what their interpretation on this point would be.
The Kentucky courts have put down an excellent rule b* their interpretation of this point of contract when they said in the case of Sayler et ux. v.Poulos et al, 3 "The use of the words more or less in describ1 275 Ky. 613, 122 S. W. 2nd 515 (1938).
2 Pierce et al v. Lefort et al,197 La. 1, 200 S.801 (1941).
S Ky., 122 S. W. 2nd 996 (1939).
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ing a boundary line relieves a stated distance of exactness means that
the parties are to. risk the quantity of the land conveyed, and implies
waiver of the warranty as to a specification."
This pbint of view as taken by the Kentucky court seems to be very
logical and is an excellent .means of preventing wild litigation by persons willing to take a chance if they can make correction in court for
a poor bargain. It also makes everyone that is a party in a conveyance
alert and is a good means of holding down the temptation of fraud.
The Minnesota courts have stepped even further in this by making
greater qualifications to prevent fraud. In the case of Ingleson et al. v.
Olson4 the court said, "words about, wore or less, and other such words
used in regard to distances 'may be disregarded if not controlled or
explained by monuments, boundaries, and other expressions of intention,
and may be given meaning and effect when so controlled and explained."
It is very apparent by the decisions which we have at hand that the.
courts have been dealing with, the intention of the parties to assume a
risk of quantity, and the courts giving there full sanction to the parties
to assume the risk if there is no indication of fraud intermingled in the
transaction; This is found to be true in Maryland 5 where it has been
said, "The words more or less used to qualify a representation of quantity in a contract to convey indicate the intention of the parties to assume a risk of quantity." It is said that these words when used in good
faith is an instrument and there is a deficiency or surplus neither party
may recover as they have assumed the risk by agreement to the instrument, but where the deficiency is unreasonably large it may strongly
indicate an attempt to commit fraud.6
In the Kentucky case of Hariison.vs. Talbot7 the court said that the
plain and most obvious meaning of the words more or less is that the
parties were to run the risk of gain or loss, as there might happen to
be an excess or deficiency in the estimated quantity.
The court said that the words "more or less" as applied to quantity
and used in a contract for the sale of lands are to be construed to
quality the representations of quantity in such a manner, that, if made
in good faith, neither party should be entitled to any relief on account
of deficiency or surplus if there is a reasonable apprehension of the
quantity stipulated.8 With this decision the many courts of the country
and the several states seem to definitely concur as it is just law and is
founded on reasonable interpretation of the law of contracts.
Quasi contract law has attempted to place both parties on an equal
standard by giving reformation of contractual instruments so that the
defendant in a cause of action will be in no better position than the
plaintiff in a case of mistake. The courts have accomplished this by
4 199 Minn. 422, 272 N. W. 270 (1937).
5 Kriel v. Cullison, 165 Md. 402, 169 A. 203 (1933).
6 Musselman et al v. Moxley 152 Md. 13, 136 A. 48 (1927).
7 32 Ky. 258 (1889).
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reformation of contractual instruments so that the defendant in a cause
of action will be in no better position than the plaintiff in a case of mistake. The courts have accomplished this by reformation and the assessment of damages so that the parties will be on an even standard where
or.e has benefited through mistake, but in the case where chance
of a variance is invited the courts have no other course than to give
the parties what they have bargained for unless a definite unreasonable
variance is apparent and a strong indication of fraudulent conduct by
the action of one of the parties is seen.
-Robert T. Fanning.

OPERATION OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN MECHANIC'S LIEN
SuITs.-The mechanic's lien is a statutory device for the protection of one
who furnishes labor or materials for the improvement of real property.
It is a security device for the benefit of materialmen and laborers and
is recorded under provisions of the statute. So far as creditors are concerned such public record serves the same purpose as possession in the
case of a common law lien; it gives notice to anyone dealing with the
owner that certain property is subject to some security interest, and
since public records are accessible to all, the law will treat persons dealing with the owner as if they were informed of all facts a diligent search
would have revealed, whether or not such search has in fact been made.
The mechanic's lien has met and overcome several difficulties in the
problems of contractors, subcontractors, and materialmen as well as
laborers, by giving them all a direct claim against the property on which
they work or into which their materials go, instead of limiting them to
personal actions against those with whom they have dealt directly. It
has, furthermore, given them the equivalent of a shorthand mortgage
on the property acquired by merely filing in the proper public office an
affidavit or a notice of claim. For practical purposes this is a cloud
on the title which the property holder must remove by settling the account
or forcing a test of the claim in court.
As a purely statutory creation which varies in various places and
is amended in each from time to time, it is the victim of much judicial
interpretation which has frequently been overly technical. Its law is
consequently full of pitfalls for owners, purchasers, and lien claimants,
particularly where the statute gives a short retroactive effect to the act
of filing the notice. In one state where the statute permitted the filing
of a lien within so many months after the work was "finished", an unpaid subcontractor long after the period expired took advantage of a
property owner's complaint about some of his work. He admitted that
it was not "finished" and after putting a very littling "finishing" work
on it filed his lien for the whole of his claim, and the court ipheld him.
In another case, Whitcomb vs. Roll,1 a contract for decorating a storeroom did not fix the time for the completion of the work. In March the
contractor rendered his bill for the contract price, and the owner, on
I

-hitcomb v. Roll 81 N. E. 106; 40 Ind. App. 119; 1907.
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May 6th, sent a check on account stipulating that the payment did not
carry with it the acceptance of the work. On June 20th the owner made
objections to the work. The contractor made changes and additions
thereto, and -within 60 days thereafter filed his notice of intention to
hold a mechanic's lien. Held, that the notice was filed within the statutory time; the delay in the completion being caused by the owner.
The Indiana law reads as follows regarding notice in. the filing of
mechanis lien claims: 2
"Any person wishing to acquire such a lien upon any property,
whether his claim be due or not, shall file in the recorder's office
of the county, at any time within sixty days after performing
such labor or furnishing such materials or machinery, described in
Section 43-701, notice of his intention to hold a lien upon such
property for the amount of his claim, specifically setting forth
the amount claimed, and giving a substantial description of such
lot

",

The general law regarding the extension of the period for filing by
doing or furnishing further work or materials is set out as follows in
Corpus Juris.3 "Where the period allowed by statute for filing a lien
has commenced to run by reason of the accrual of the indebtedness, the
completion of the building, the work of claimant, or the furnishing of
the materials, claimant cannct therafter extend the time by doing or
furnishing small items and thereby fixing a date from which the period
must commende anew to run, especially where the furnishing of such
item is merely colorable and the real intention is to save or restore a
right which is already imperiled or lost, or to obtain an advantage over
other persons, or where the additional work is done or additional materials are furnished without the knowledge, authority, request, of consent
of the owner, or the work done is not properly construction work, or the
materials furnished are not reasonable necessary to the completion of
the building or improvement in question, or the furnishing of labor is
relied on to extend the time for filing a lien for materials. "This labor
gratuitously performed cannot have the effect of extending the time
for filing a lien for what was done or furnished under a contract, nor
can a materiabman extend the time for filing his lien claim by gratuitously replacing defective articles previously furnished and charged for.
It has been held in some cases that the extra work done or additional
materials furnished at the request of the owner after the full completion
of the original contract may extend the time for filing a lien claim for
all the work; but in other cases the contrary is held. The question
whether the work done is sufficient to extend the time for filing the lien
does not arise where the work is done by a person other than claimant,
and the statute requires the filing of the claim within a specified period
of time after claimant has ceased to labor or furnish materials."
The Indiana courts are in the habit of putting a strict construction
upon the operation of the mechanic's lien statute. A review of two cases
2 Burn's Indiana Statutes, Section 43-703.
3 40 Corpus Juris Page 202-204, Section 238.
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will illustrate the fact. In the case of Chapman-Stein Co. vs. Lippincott Glass Co.4 the court held." Where the time had elapsed for filing
a mechanic's lien against real estate for labor and material furnished
by claimant for the construction of tanks by the lien-claimant's employee after the expiration of the time in which to assert a lien, did not
give the right to assert a lien." Here the court by construing the
statute strictly, held the insertion of bricks in tanks already completed
except for this minor detail, was not of sufficient consequence to entitle
the claimant to enforce the alleged lien. In the case of Kendallville
Lumber Co. vs. Adams,5 the court held: "Where a contractor abandoned
the work and it was completed by the owner, the latter purchasing
materials from the same materialman, the time for filing notice of lien
for the materials furnished to the contractor could not be exiended by
tacking together the two accounts of the contractor and the owner".
Again the court held on a strict contruction of the statute.
In a strictly equitable situation it is probable that a court of equity
would hold different if the facts of case justified the action. Under the
rule laid down in Drake Lumber Co. v. E. L. Semple,6 a Florida case,
the court held: "'Courts of equity will keep an encumbrance alive or
consider it extinguished, as will best serve the purpose of justice and the
just intention of the parties." In a Massachusetts case of Miller vs.
Wilkinson,7 the facts were as follows: A contractor for the plumbing
work and heating apparatus of a house finished, in August, everything
except placing at the back of a washbowl a marble slab about 8 inches
high by 18 inches long. The owner of the building refused payment
until the slab was placed in position, and later stated that he was
unable to pay. The contractor then placed the slab in position for the
purpose of enabling him to file a mechanic's lien for the entire work.
The court held that the contract was not completed until the slab was
put up, and the finding of the lower court that the time ran from then
would not be disturbed. Further examples sustain the theory that equity
will intervene in certain cases. In the case of Frederick County National Bank vs. Dunn.8 -a Maryland case, the court held: "Where the
owner insists that a building is not completed and that he will not accept
it, owing to some imperfection, he is estopped thereafter from denying
that the building was completed prior to the date of corrections of the
imperfection."
On the theory of estoppel, a California court9 clearly
stated the equitable theory of the problem. Here the court held that the
owner may be estopped by his acts or representations from taking advantage of the failure of a sub-contractor to file his claim or notice of
lien within the statutory period; but merely standing by and permitting
claimant to sleep upon his rights does not estop the owner.
4
5
6
7
8
9

Chapman-Stein
411 ; 1928.

Co. v. Lippincott Glass Works 161 N.

E. 645; 87 Ind. App.

Kendallville Lumber Co. v. Adams. 176 N. E. 555; 93 Ind. App. 141; 1931.
Drake Lumber Co. v. E. L. Semple. 130. So. 577; 100 Fla. 1757; 1930.
Miller v. Wilkinson. 44 N. E. 1083; 167 Mass. 136; 1896.
Frederick County National Bank v. Dunn. 1915; 93 AtI. 984; 125 Md. 392.
Pence v. Martin. 185 Pac. 508; 43 Cal. App. 626. (1919).
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As evidenced by the Ohio General Code it is clear that the equitable
principles run not only in favor of the claimant but also when proper
presented in favor of owner of the property. Section 8310 and 8314
of the Ohio General Code provide:

"Contract to furnish material being completed,1O subsequent
gratuitous replacement to remedy original defect will not extend
time for claiming mechanic's lien."
"In absence of contract provisions, subcontractor,11 having
completed work, cannot, by gratuitous repairs or by asserting
obligation to repair for indefinite period extend statutory period
for filing mechanic's lien."
Of particular interest with regard to the rights of creditors, is the
-case of Randall vs. Wagner Glass Co.,12 which presents an exceptional
situation among the cases. In thisl3 case it appeared that the holder
of a mechanic's lien on corporate property was a party to receivership
proceedings to wind up the corporation's affairs brought within the year
in which foreclosure proceedings could be instituted. The holder of the
mechanic's lien filed an intervening petition in such proceedings to enforce the lien within the time fixed by the court for the proof of claims,
but not within the time, sixty days, allowed for enforcing such liens
after filing the same. The court held, however, that the claimant was
entitled to the enforcement of the lien notwithstanding the intervening
petition was not filed until more than a year, the statutory period of
enforcement, from the date the lien was filed; and in so doing it said:
"The receivership being in the nature of an "equitable execution", the
court having absolute control of the property and full power to adjust
claims, determine priorities, order sale, and fix the distribution of funds;
the whole case is drawn into equity. A party need not litigate his
claim in another suit; and where he does not ask for leave so to do,
but submits his claim to the court having control of the receivership,
in full compliance with its orders, no good reason can be found for
making an exception to the equitable procedure in the receivership by
invoking the limitations of the statute."
A final case involving the filing of a mechanic's lien is the case of
New York-Brooklyn Fuel Corp. vs. Fuller.14 In that case the referee
in bankruptcy was reversed by the Circuit Judge, holding that when a
claimant under a mechanic's lien claim filed his claim after the defendant
was adjudged a bankrupt, but within the period allowed by the Lien
Law of the state, the lien was good, and the trustee in bankruptcy took
the property subject to the lien v. Fuller.
-Robert A. Oberfell.
10 Ohio General Code, Section 8310.
11 Ohio General Code,
12 Randall v. Wagner
13 Randall v. Wagner
14 New York-Brooklyn

Section 8314.
Glass Works. 94 N. E. 739; 47 Ind. App. 439; 1911.
Glass Works. 75 A. L,. R. 718; 1911.
Fuel Corp. v. Fuller, 11 Fed. 2nd. 802; 1926.
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REFORMATION BY SELF-HELP.-The consideration of the problem of
self-help in reforming contracts involves the question of whether one of
the parties to the contract, without the knowledge or assent of the other
parties, may alter the instrument so that it conforms to the actual intent
of the parties and reads as the parties intended it to read.
There is a well settled rule of law that a material alteration of
a contract or instrument by one of the parties thereto will release the
other contracting party.1 The test as to whether the alteration is
material or not is whether it changes the instrument, giving it a
different legal effect, and works a change in' the rights, interests or
obligations of the parties,2 or, briefly, whether the instrument will
have the same legal effect after the alteration as before.3
Despite the generality of the above rule there is a wide split of
authority when the instrument is altered merely for the purpose of
correcting a mistake and reforming the contract so that it conforms
to the original agreement and there is no fraud committed by the party
altering the instrument. The majority of the courts hold that when
the alteration is done innocently and with the intent of reforming the
instrument so that it expresses the original agreement of the parties
then that is not such an alteration as will vitiate the instrument. There
is a lqrge minority holding that any material alteration, regardless of
the intent of the party altering, will release the other party and vitiate
the instrument.4
The majority rule holds that an alteration for the innocent purpose
of reforming the instrument so that it conforms to the original agreement is not such an alteration as will vitiate the instrument.5
The
reasoning of the courts in upholding this rule is that the assent of
the parties to such an alteration will be implied.6 In keeping with
the majority rule the Georgia court in Jackson vs. Johnson, held that
in a case where a bond was executed and the amount was mistakenly
written as $150 rather than $150,000 as the parties intended and the
principal and payee, without the assent of the sureties, put in the
word thousand, such was not an alteration that would vitiate the
1

Barnes-Smith Mercantile Co. vs. Tate. (1911) 156 Mo. App. 236, 137 S. W. 619,
Koons vs. St. Louis Car Co. (1907) 203 Mo. 227, 101 S. W. 49.

2 Bank of Moberly vs. Meals (1927)
3

316 Mo. 1158, 295 S. W. 73.

Criner vs. Davenport-Bethel Co. (1936)

144 Old. 74, 289 Pac. 74k.

4 States following the majority rule are: Illinois (cases both ways), Indiana,
Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, North Dakota, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin.
States following the minority rule are: Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas,
Vermont, Virginia. See annotation in 73 A. L. R. 652.
5 Klundby vs. Hodgin (1930) Wis 232 N. W. 858,
Levy vs. Arons (1913) 142 N. Y. Supp. 312.
6 Busjohn vs. McLean (1892) 3 Ind. App. 281, 29 N. E. 494,
Lee vs. Butler (1897) 167 Mass. 426, 46 N. E. 52,
Rlundby vs. Hodgin, a pra 5.
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instrument if the sureties signed with the knowledge and understanding that it would be for the larger amount.7 In a case where the
amount on a note was changed from $170 to $175 without the knowledge or consent of the surety but with the knowledge of the payee the
Indiana court held that the surety impliedly consented to the alteration.8
The courts holding the minority rule say that any material alteration
will vitiate the instrument and release the non-assenting party.9 The
reasons given by these courts for the rule is that it is unwise to permit
one party to alter it without the assent of the other party. The courts
say to do so would do away with the jurisdiction of the court of equity
to reform contracts and the party has an adequate remedy in a court
of chancery to reform the instrument.1o The New Jersey court, on this
point in Hunt vs. Gray,11 stated as the reason for the rule that "To
maintain that a party'may reform a written instrument by his own act
is, in reality, to convert all contracts into oral contracts; the written
instrument would no longer be the depositary of the intention of the
parties, but either party'could make it accord with the remembrance of
the bystanders. This would be to allow the party to do what the court
cannot do at the trial-that is, resort to evidence aliunde to ascertain
what was meant. If the writing does not hit the real design of the
parties to it, the error must be corrected in a court of equity."
Following the minority rule the Missouri Court in Owings vs. Arnotl2
where a note was executed on the 14th of May 1859 but was mistakenly
dated May 1858 and was payable at a certain date after date and the
note was assigned on the same day it was executed by the payee and the
assignee wrote the figure 9 over the figure 8 so that the note read 1859
the actual date of its execution, held that it was a material alteration
and the instrument was vitiated. In Kelly vs. Trimble,13 the obligee in
a bond added certain words to the instrument which was for the future
conveyance of land. The words gave him immediate right of possession
rather than forcing him to wait until the conveyance was made. The
court held that 'even though this agreed with the true intent of the
'parties it was a material alteration and the instrument was vitiated
thereby.
It would seem that between the two rules the minority rule has the
better reasoning. After all the whole purpose of allowing reformation
in courts of equity is to provide a remedy for people who make innocent
7

(1881)

8

Busjoh

9

Suraz 1.

10

67 Ga. 167.
vs. MCI= su ra 6.

Taylor v8. Taylor (1883)

12 Lea (Tenn)

714,

Merritt Ms.Dewey (1905) 218 Ill. 599, 75 N. E. 1066.
11

(1871) 85 N. J. L. 227.

33 Mo. 406.

12

(1863)

13

74 Ill. 428 (1874).
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mistakes in writing their contracts. These courts would be better able
to decide when an innocent mistake, one that will be just grounds for
relief, has occurred than the party to the contract whose view just might
be prejudiced. Some weight too should be given to the parol evidence
rule. The aIterations, in effect, throw the who proceedings in parol testimony and it becomes little more than a dispute of fact and the written
instrument is practically valueless.
Another reason for upholding the minority rule might be found in
the weight of evidence necessary to sustain an action, for relief of an
innocent mistake. In the equity courts in reformation in order to be
entitled to relief the plaintiff must prove the mistake by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence,14 and mere preponderance of the evidence
is insufficient.15 The courts of law require only a prepondence of the
evidence and under the minority rule it seems that the question of mistake is decided by the court of law. After a careful examination of
the cases under the majority rule the courts merely say that the mistake
is "amply sustained by the evidence" 16 and it does not seem fallacious
to reason from this statement that the courts do not mean that the mistake was proved by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence but it
seems more likely they are referring to a preponderance of the evidence.
If this reasoning is true then no attorney would take his client into an
equity court for reformation in a mistake of this kind for the simple
thing to do is to have the client reform the instrument so that it agrees
with the intent of the parties and then sue on the instrument and prove
the mistake by a preponderance of the evidence rather than by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence as the equity courts demand. This sort
of thing provides the means by which unscrupulous persons take advantage of the law and commit fraud in derogation of the rights of
innocent parties.
A large number of the cases following the majority rule hold that
an alteration made innocently and only with the intent of making the
instrument conform to the agreement of the parties, that such an alteration is immaterial and upon this ground in theory the cases may be
reconciled. When the courts following the majority rule base their
decision upon the ground that assent to the alteration will be implied
then the cases are completely irreconcilable.
As an example of the complete conflict between the cases the case of
changing the date in a note is an example. The minority rule holds this
to be a material alteration and it thus vitiates the instrument.l7 The
14

Peters vs. Schochner 312 Mo. 609, 200 S. W. 424 (1931).

15 General Refractories Co. vs. Sebek 238 Mo. 1148, 44 S. W. (2d) 60.
16

Klundbly vs. Hogden eupra 5.
Busjohn vs. McLean suzrn 6.

17 Murray vs. Graham (1870) 29 Iowa 520,
Owings vs. Arnot (1863) 33 Mo. 406.
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majority rule holds that this is not such an alteration as will vitiate the
instrument.18
The effect of the enactment of the Negotiable Instruments Law in
the states holding the majority rule may change the rule as to negotiable
instruments. The State of Indiana prior to the enactment of the Negotiable Instruments Law held with the majority rulel9 but in later cases
dealing with negotiable instruments in which the alteration was to the
interest and which under the Negotiable Instruments Law was a material
alteration, the court cited the act and held that the alteration voided
2
the instrument. 0
There is another question closely allied with the preceding one and
that is whether the party altering the instrument, after having lost his
action at law on the instrument because the defense was alteration,
could come into a court of equity and ask for reformation because• of
his innocent mistake and the contract does not express the true intent
of the parties before the alteration. This question would not arise under
the majority rule because the case would be good in a court of law but
in the states following the minority rule the question is very pertinent.
The state of Missouri follows the minority rule and holds that a
material alteration of a written instrument by one of the parties will
release the other party if made without his consent, even though the
alteration is made in good faith to make the instrument conform to the
real agreement of the parties.21 This alone would seem authority for
holding that the party altering could not have reformation for if the
party is discharged as to the instrument then the court could hardly
reform the instrument and again charge him under it. However the
courts of Missouri have gone further than this and in a case where a
trust deed was altered so as to conform to the land actually affected
by description, the court held it to be a material alteration rendering
the instrument void and reformation of the instrument would not be
given.22
Hal E. Hunter, Jr.

18

Duker vs. Franz (1870). 7 Bush (Ky.) 273,
First Nat. Bank vs. Spalding (1918) 177 Cal. 217; 170 Pac. 407.

19

Busjohn vs. YicLeit supra 6,
John Kindler Co. vs. First Nat. Bank (1915)

20

Born vs. Lafayette Auto Co. 196 Intd. 399, 145 N. E. 833. (1923).

2i Supra 1.
22 Barhart vs. L.ttle 185 S. W. 175.

61 Ind. App. 79, 109 N. E. 66.
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RIGHTs-A right is a well-founded claim. Thomas Jefferson expressed
the fundamental doctrine of rights and government as applied to our
system when he stated in the Declaration of Independence: "We hold
these truth to be self-evident; that all men are created equal; that they
are endowed by their creatorwith certain inalienablerights; that among
these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that to secure these
rights governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers
from the consent of the governed; . ."

"The idea of rights is coexistent with that of authority (or government); both are inherent in man; but if we understand by government
a coherent system of laws by which a state is ruled, and if we understand by state, a sovereign society with distinct authorities to make
and execute laws, then rights precede government, or the establishment
of states, which is expressed in the ancient law maxim: 'Ne ex regula
jus sumatur, sed ex jure quod est, regula fiat." 2
Let us classify3 rights so that we may better understand their
natures. There are, first of all, Perfect and Imperfect rights; things we
have a right to possess or actions we have a right to do, are or may
be fixed and determinate; these are perfect rights. For example: the
withholding of a man's property brings forth a perfect right in that
man to recover it. Things or actions are vague and indeterminate such
as in the case of a man of poor means asking for relief; although we
have a moral obligation to aid this poor individual, there isn't the
demand of that obligation in the law. It is discretionary with the individual or group. This type is an imperfect right.
We further classify rights as to Absolute and Qualified rights. One
absolute is similar to the perfect type, of a man to recover what belongs
to him, as distinguished from the qualified right of an agent,- in possession of property of his principal, to regain it, if taken from his custody.
Natural and civil rights have been merged into one kind, for the
reason that the civil right is the modern pronouncement of the natural
right. However, we do have a distinction between political and civil
rights. The political, more properly called, privilege, consists in the
power to participate, directly or indirectly- in the establishment or
management of government. This is fixed by the constitution and includes privileges of voting and holding a public office. Now, civil rights
cover a vast area of rights, and in noting the sub-classification remember
the words quoted from the Declaration of Independence, above. Civil
rights have no relation whatever to the establishment and management
of government, but rather, give powers to acquire and enjoy property,
exercise paternal and marital functions, etc. Full enjoyment is guaranteed to 'everyone, but this is not so with political rights; for instance:
aliens have no political, but always have civil rights.
1

Declaration of Independence.

2

Bouvier's Law Dictionary (Vol. 2), p. 2960.

3

Tbid, pp. 2960-2962.
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Civil rights are sub-divided into absolute and relative forms. There
are three kinds of those absolute:4 (1) that of personal security; the
legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of life, limbs, body, health, and
reputhtion. (2) the right of personal liberty; the power of locomotion,
of changing one's situation or removing one's person to whatsoever
place the inclination may direct, without any restraint unless by due
course of law. And (3) the right of property; the free use, enjoyment,
and disposal of all his acquisitions without any control or diminution
save only the laws of the land.5
Those which are relative are either public or private in nature. They
are public when between the people and the government; the protection
for the people in return for the allegiance to the state. They are private
as to reciprocal rights between husband and wife; parent and child;
guardian and ward; and master and servant.
Beyond this there are the legal as distinguished from the equitable
rights, the former being when possessing legal title, one's remedy is
an action in law, and the latter calling for an enforcement of equitable
rights in the courts of Equity.
There we have the whole classification in its many phases. The governing factor should always be borne in mind: rights do-precede govern.meat and the state.6 This is fundamental, important, and vital to our
way of life!
William Bodden.
4 Hale V. Everett, 534 N. H. a, 60, 16 Am..Rep. 82.
5 State V. Greer, 102 So. 739, 743, 88 Fla. 249; 37A. L. R. 1298.
6 State ex. rel. McGreal v. Phelps, 128 N. W. 1041, 1045, 144 Wis. 1, 85 L. R. A.
N. S. 858.
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THE EMERGENCY PRICE CONTROL ACT OF 1942
When the United States started its program of building for its defense
at the start of World War II, immediately forces were put in motion
which threw a tremendous strain on the normal economic activity within the country. During normal times prices of goods are determined
by the economic law of supply and demand. And supply and demand
are forced toward equalization by prices. However, when the United
States began to arm and produce goods for war, many consumer goods
were discontinued. The government, regardless of prices, needed materials for war. By using its great purchasing power, money was poured
into the markets for these goods. The "law of supply and demand" and
other economic principles were unable to meet this sudden force. People
found themselves with more money but fewer commodities to buy. Thus
the demand for goods was much greater than the supply. A process of
bidding for these consumer goods forced the prices up higher and higher.
When this happened more money was demanded for work. Thus was
started the turmoil of spiraling inflation.
The danger of economic chaos was made a stark reality to the people
of the country, particularly people of fixed incomes and businesses. In
order to protect the people from this situation and prevent the collapse
of the home front economically behind the war front, the United States
Congress passed the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 1 early in
1942. A brief summary of the Act will help in understanding just what
the government is doing to prevent the disaster of inflation from breaking loose in this country.
Section 901 sets out the purpose of the Act as in the interest of national defense and security and necessary to the effective prosecution
of the present war-to stabilize prices and prevent speculative and unwarranted and abnormal increases in prices and rents; to prevent profiteering, hoarding, manipulation, speculation, and other disruptive practices; to prevent defense appropriations from being dissipated by excess prices; to protect persons with relatively fixed incomes; to secure
adequate production; and to prevent post emergency collapse of values.
Section 902 empowers the administrator to set maximum or minimum
prices for commodities which threaten to raise or have risen to a point
which is contrary to the purpose of the Act. He can do this by order
and in his judgment fair and equitable to give effect to the purpose of
the Act. He shall be guided by prices which prevailed between October 1
and October 15, 1941. Further factors are set out which shall further
guide the administrator. Every maximum price order as set shall be
accompanied by a statement of the considerations involved in its issuance. It provides also that insofar as possible the Administrator shall
consult with advisory representative committees of industries to be
affected by the price fixing. Then in cases where a maximum price has
been fixed, upon request of a substantial representative number of the
industry affected by the price, the Administrator shall appoint a com1

50 U.

S. A. C. A. App. Sec. 901-948.
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mittee truly representative of the industry affected, to consult with and
determine the difficulties arising under the regulation.. But regardless
of this, the Administrator may issue temporary maximum price regulations effective for no more than sixty days, which may freeze the
price prevailing for any commodity within five days prior to the date
of issuance of the regulation.
Under this section it is important to note with regard to the question
of "notice and hearing" that the statute itself evidences some doubt as
to the necessity of notice and hearing, but yet by the wording, the Act
provides a ground or implied basis whereby the courts could find that
a notice and hearing are provided for. This question will be discussed
more fully later.
Subdivision (b) of the same section empowers the Administrator to
set rentals and make April 1, 1941, the date upon which, as nearly as
practicable, rates should be set.
Subdivision (e) empowers the Administrator, whenever he determines that the maximum necessary production of the commodity is not
being obtained, on behalf of the United States, without regard to the
provisions of law requiring competitive bidding, to buy or sell at public
or private sale, or store or use, such commodity in such a manner as
he determines to be necessary to obtain the maximum necessary production.
Section 903 puts limitations on the Administrator in his power to
effect and set prices on Agricultural produce.
Under Title II-Administration and Enforcement, Section 9921, provides for the creation of the Office of Price Administration and the
office of the Administrator.
Section 922 (a) authorized the Administrator to make such studies
and investigations and to obtain such information as he deems necessary
or proper to assist him in prescribing any regulation or order under
the Act.
Subsection (b) provides that the Administrator is authorized by regulation or order to require any person engaged in business of dealing
with commodities or who rents, to furnish such information under oath
and to make and keep records and make reports.
Subsection (c)

authorizes the use of subpoenas to require appearance.

Section 923 provides that within sixty days after the issuance of any
regulation or order or price schedule, any person subject to it may file
a protest specifically setting forth objections to the order or schedule.
Provides that after sixty days a person can file a protest but only on
grounds which arise after the sixty-day period. The section then says
"the administrator shall either grant or deny such protest in whole or
in part, notice such protest for hearing or provide an opportunity to
present further evidence in connection therewith." If the Administrator
denies the protest he shall answer by giving economic data or other
facts on which his opinion is based.
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Under the above quoted language it can be seen that the Administrator may in acting on a protest, grant a hearing or deny the protest at
his own discretion. There is no provision which allows a hearing on the
protest as a matter of right. If the Administrator refuses to grant a
hearing on the protest, the protestor will have to appeal to the court.
This appeal is provided for in Section 924 which establishes for review of the denial or partial denial of the Administrator of a protest
by filing within thirty days a complaint in the Emergency Court of
Appeals. This court is to have exclusive jurisdiction to set aside the
order or regulation or to dismiss the complaint. This section also creates
the Emergency Court of Appeals.
Section 925 provides for the enforcement and penalties fox failure
to comply with the Act.
After examining this Act, grave questions arise as to whether such a
broad program such as price fixing and rent regulation can be sustained
as constitutional. The justification for the Act must be found if at all2
under the War Powers of the Federal Government. The Constitution
in Article 1 provides for the War Powers. It provides that Congress
shall have power to lay and collect taxes. . ., to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States.
Clauses 11 to 17 provide for the control of the army and navy and
carrying out the defense by enumerated powers of control over 6.nd
pursuant to military forces and war. Clause 18 authorizes Cong ress to
"make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying intoexecution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or officer thereof."
The Federal District Courts have been presented with the question of
the constitutionality of the Act several times. An examination of these
decisions will help toward understanding of the scope of the War
Powers, with reference to this Emergency Price Control Act. These
decisions also discuss the problem of the delegation of legislative power
to an administrative tribunal. This later problem is of utmost importance as to the constitutionality of the Act as far as Administrative Law
is concerned as the direct constitutional question of the power to enact
the law in the first place.
In the case of United States -v. Hark et a13 the court held that the
price control feature of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 constitute a legitimate exercise of the war power of Congress and are constitutional. The court reasoned that since the Supreme Court had under
the same War Powers upheld such measures as taking over railroads,4
5
taking over and operating telephone and telegraph lines; and has ap2 Article 1. Sec. 8, Clause 1.
3 49 Fed. Supp. 95, (1943). See also Brown, Administrator v. Wick et at, 48 Fed.

Supp. 887. (1942).
4 N. Pac. Railroa4 Co. v. Dakota, 250 U, S. 135, 63 L ed. 897, (1919).
5. Dakota Central Telephone Co. v. South Dakta, ex rel., 250 U. S. 163, 63 Leed.

910, (1919).
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proved the invasion of the freedom of the individual by compulsory military service,6 these War Powers are broad enough to cover the fixing
of prices and protecting the home front. The court says that this act is
a legitimate exercise of the War Powers of Congress "which is broad
and well-nigh limitless."
The court also sustains the act on the grounds of a valid delegation
of power to the Administrative agency.7 It held that "the delegation
here is specific and limited by the very terms of the Act. Congress in
the exercise of its legislative function has determined the legislative
policy and its formulation as a rule of conduct, by specifying the basic
conclusions of fact upon ascertainment of which from relevant data by
a designated administrative agency, it ordains that its statutory command is to be effective."
Then in the case of United States v. C. Thomas Stores8 the court
said that war does not in and of itself give rise to any additional constitutional power, but power to meet any emergency caused by war is
granted by the Constitution, and any limitation on such power must
likewise be found in the Constitution. The court gives the same reasons
as the U. S. v. Hark case (supra). Then the court says that in determining whether the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 violated constitutional limitations on the delegation of legislative power, practical
and rational considerations must be applied because of the necessity for
adopting and applying intricate and complex details to rapidly changing conditions. The court added that "the statute does not violate constitutional limitations on the delegation of legislative power if the
statute clearly states its purpose and establishes standards by which
such purposes are to be accomplished. The Court then discusses the act
and its established standards and concludes that the act is sufficient
and is not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
In the case of Broum, Administrator v. Wyatt Food Stores, Inc.9 the
court held in effect the same as the above mentioned eases. But the court
added that "under the Constitutional provision that Congress shall have
power to declare war and to make all necessary and proper laws, the
power of Congress is almost limitless." The court said that the "due
process" clause of the Fifth amendment is for the protection of the
citizen but such amendment does not work a destruction of the general
war declaring and war making provisions of the Constitution."
In Brown, Administrator v. AyelloIO the court said, "in determining
how far Congress should go in defining the power of the Administratdr,
the wide spread effect of the Emergency Price Control Act and the impossibility of enacting a law to cover all contingencies and the necessity
6 Arver et al v. United Stoles, 245 U. S. 366, 62 ]. ed. 349, (1918).
7 See als U. S. v. Slobodkin. 48 F. Supp. 913, (1943).
8 49 F. Supp. 111 (1943). See also Brown, Administrator, v. Bernstein, 49 F.
Supp. 497 (1943).

,9 49 F. Supp. 538 (1943). See also
(1943).
10 50 F. Supp. 391 (1941).
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of permitting administrative discretion in carrying out the Act must
be considered." The court then decided that the Act sufficiently set up
standards by which the Administrator is to be guided and thus was not
unconstitutional as a delegation of legislative power. The case also
attacked the Act on the grounds that it was an infringement of the
"reserved powers of the states." However, the court said that Congress
under the War Powers has ample power to enact the law. In answer
to the charge that the Act takes property without "due process of law"
the court said that "all property rights are held subjee- to proper
legislative regulation."
In the case of United States v. Friedman.l the court gave predominate notice to the "state of emergency." The court said "the Emergency
Price Control Act of 1942 does not violate the constitutional limitation
against "delegation of legislative power" in view of the broad delegation permissible because of the war emergency."
The case of Brown, Administrator v. Warner Holding Co.112 goes
farther than the others in upholding the Act. The court here saying
"that under its war power, the United States Government may not only
direct the lives of its citizens but may utilize their complete resources.
To support its contention the court here cites the Supreme Court in its
holdings on the taking over of railroads and telephone communications
under the war powers. The court then held that the act does not exceed
the war powers granted to Congress.
One case, Roach v. Johnson,i3 in construing the Act under the rent
regulations has held it unconstitutional. Later, however, the Supreme
Court dismissed the whole case on the grounds of collusion.13a But ill
spite of this, the court's holdings are interesting. The court said that
"the constitution is intended to be enforced and complied with in time
of war as well as time of peace. If the citizens are to be punished for
the crime of violating a legislative order of an executive officer or of a
board or commission "due process of law" requires that it shall appear
that the order is within the authority of the officer or board, and if
that authority depends on determination of fact those determinations
must be shown." The court said that in creating an administrative
agency certain rules and standards must be established with which the
agency is to operate. Then the court adds this interesting note, "Congress never intended that the Administrator of the Emergency Price
Control Act should have the power to create defense rental areas and
fix maximum rentals without hearings or determinations of fact,
otherwise such act would be unconstitutional as a "delegation of legislative power" and as contrary to "due process of law." The court finally
held that when the Administrator created a defense rental area with11
50 F. Supp. 584 (1943).
F. Supp. 586 (1943).
12

50 F. Supp. 593
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48 F.

13a

See also U. S. v. Sosnowitz & Lotstein, Inc., et al. 50
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Supp. 833 (1943.
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out hearings or determinations of fact, the action was unconstitutional.13b
Another case, Payne v. GriOin,14 also held the rent feature of the
act unconstitutional. The court said, and it is sound, that "war conditions do not enlarge constitutional power, but Congress must establish
the standards of legal obligation." Under the constitutional article
enumerating the powers of Congress, powers are.granted to Congress
but Congress is not authorized to delegate those powers. Congress must
declare a policy and fix a definite standard by which an administrator
is to be controlled and authorize him to make subordinate rules for
administration of the act, but Congress cannot Dermit the administrator to determine-what the law shall be.
The court added that when Congress enacts a law to become effective
when specified conditions come into existence and delegates to an administrative officer authority to determine when such conditions have
come into existence, the prerequisites to the administrator's action must
be stated and compliance must be shown with the standard laid down
by Congress and if the administrator's authority depends upon a determination of facts, that determination must be shown. The courts have
no power to determine policy, but they have the duty to preserve constitutional liberties.
The court then held the section of the Emergency Price Control Act,
authorizing the administrator, without a notice or hearing, to fix generally fair and equitable maximum rents for defense rental areas and
making such rents conclusive after sixty days, denies "due process of
law," notwithstanding the provision for protest and appeal from the
administrator's regulations, where the protest and appellate procedure
was inconvenient and expensive.
The court went even further and declared the rent control section
13b An interesting attack on the act was made in Diefenbaugh v. Cook, 1942 Ind.
O.P.A. Service p. 622-:1. 142 A.L.R. 1522. The grounds for attack on the constitutionality of the act were based on the contention that Congress did not have the
power to set up special courtJ exclusively to hear contests arising under the act. The
whole thing was that this procedure being unconstitutional the act was also invalid
and the attack was thus centered on this procedural question under the act.
Dean Clarence Manion of the University of Notre Dame Law School, sitting as
special judge said: "While the power of inferior tribunals, such as the court, to pass
upon the validity of statutes in the course of j;dicial administration is unquestioned,
nevertheless, the exercise of such power should be carefully limited. Unless it appears
clearly beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute is unconstitutional it is considered
better practice for inferior courts to assume that it is constitutional until the contrary is declared by a court of appellate jurisdiction. In a complete and ultimate consideration of the constitutional validity of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942,
grave questions will be encouhtered concerning the extent to which Congress has attempted therein to delegate its power and to what effect upon the right of this plaintiff
under the due process clause of the Fifth Article of Amendment to the United States
Constitution. . .
Meanwhile neither the Act nor the proceedings taken pursuant to
its provisions have been shown to this court to be unconstitutional beyond a reasonable
dooubt. This being the case, the inferior court is at liberty, nay, it is required to consider the practical results of its decision herein."
14 51 F. Supp. 588 (1943).
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unconstitutional on the grounds of an invalid delegation of legislative
power.
These cases brings up the important question of notice and hearing.
As we have seen the Act itself does not specifically provide for a notice
and a hearing. This brings up an important Administrative Law problem which is aimed directly at the action taken by the Administrator
under the Act which is also a constitutional problem Thus in order to
sustain the Act on this later ground the courts must find implied
noticing and hearing at some point under the Act. Several cases show
the Supreme Courts view on the subject of implied notice and hearing.
In the case of Johan Paulson et al v. City of Portland15\ a city
ordinance which made no provision for a notice and a hearing of any
kind to property holders for assessments for new sewers was being
attacked as unconstitutional. The court held that "that which is implied
in a statute is as much a part of it as that which is expressed; and
where a statute or an ordinance provides for stated meetings of a board,
designates the place at which the meetings are to be held, and directs
that all persons interested in the matter may be heard before it, it is
implied thereby, that some suitable notice shall be given to the parties
interested." The court said that the taxpayer has a right to be heard
where an attempt is made to cast upon his particular property a certain proportion of the burden of the cost for the construction of a
sewer. The court held under the facts that since provision is made for
notice and hearing (implied being used here) of each proprietor, at
some stage of the proceedings, there is no taking of his property without due process of law.
Then in the case of R. W.'Bratton v. William C. Chandler16 a statute
provided the Real Estate Brokers License Commission not only could
require applicant to furnish evidence of his qualifications, but could
procure independent of him any proof it may deem desirable, and this
without any provision for notice or opportunity to meet the evidence
so procured, not even to be advised of the notice or source of the evidlence, and the ordinance is challenged on the grounds that there is no
"due process of law" because of no provision for hearing and notice.
The court held that in view of the rule that a statute must be construed if fairly possible so as to avoid not only the conclusion
that it is unconstitutional but also grave doubts upon that score,
the words of a statute that the commission is authorized to "require
and procure" satisfactory proof as to the applicant, will not be held
to be unconstitutional as giving the applicant no opportunity to meet
evidence procured by the commission as to his qualifications. The court
reasoned that by the careful drawing of the act, the licensing process
was to be conducted openly and freely. The word, "procure" means
nothing more than "affirmative direction on the part of the commission,
necessarily to be exercised in supplement to the action of the appli.
15
16

149 U. S. 80, 57 L. Ed. 687 (1883).
260 U. S. 110, 67 L. Ed. 157 (1922).
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cant and with the same publicity and opportunity of the applicant to
be heard." Thus the court in effect held that an implied notice and
hearing would be read into the statute.
However, the court's holding can be questioned. This is because the
court does not point out the ground for reading into the statute implied notice and hearing. The judge merely states that there is such a
thing, but does not justify the application of it to the ordinance involved in the case. The judge begs the issue of implied notice and
hearing.
In the case of Gabriel Toombs Appt. v. Citizens Bank of Waynesborl7 a state statute provided that it shall be the duty of the officers
and directors of the bank, upon receiving notice from the superintendent
of banking, that its capital has become impaired to immediately call a
special meeting of the stockholders for the purpose of making an assessment on its stockholders sufficient to cover the impairment. The court
held that even where there is no provision in the statute for notice to
stockholders of a corporate meeting, common law principles require that
reasnable notice be given. In construing the statute itself as distinguifhed from the action taken under it, the court held that from the
words of the statute itself, it may be construed as impliedly requiring
reasonable notice of such meeting to be first given.
One of the most comprehensive cases on the subject which was decided
under the Emergency Price Control Act is Brown, Administrator v.
Winter.Is The court held that the Emergency Price Control Act of
1942, as amended, is not unconstitutional as being an unwarranted "delegation of legislative power," since it states in clear, concise language
Congressional policy with respect to the subject matter and embodies
a standard of administration. The court then says, "the establishment
of a maximum rent is a quasi-legislative function, rather than quasijudicial, since such regulation operates prospectively and establishes
rules of general conduct binding upon many persons. There is no constitutional requirement of a hearing prior to or in connection with this
exercise of a quasi-legislative function."
Then the court held that Congress has tremendous power to enact
drastic legislation to meet the emergency of war, which would be wholly
improper in peace time and under such "war power" may regulate
prices of food, rent and other necessities of life. The "war power" of
Congress is the power to wage war successfully, and thus it permits the
harnessing of the entire energies of the people in a supreme co-operative
effort to preserve the nation. Thus the court held that the Emergency
Price Control Act is a valid exercise of the "war powers" of Congress.
However, there are several cases which hold that implied notice and
hearing will not be read into an Act, and if they are not provided for
the act is unconstitutional. In the case of Wuchter v. Pizzutti19 the
17 281 U. S. 643, 74 L. Ed. 1088 (1930).
18 50 F. Supp. 804 (1943).
19 276 U. S. 13, 72 L. Ed. 446 (1928).
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constitutionality of a non-resident automobilist statute was attacked.
The court said that "a law designating a state official as the proper
person to receive service of process in an action against a non-resident
for injury by the use of a motor vehicle on the highway must, to be
valid, contain a provision making it reasonably probable that the notice
will be communicated to the person sued." The fact that the defendant
non-resident had actual notice of the suit does not render valid the
statute under which the suit was brought, which permitted service of
process on a state official without providing notice to the defendant, or
validate the judgment rendered in accordance with the provisions of
such statute.
From this case, the Supreme Court refused to read in an implied
notice and hearing. Thus when a statute does not provide for these
requisites it is unconstitutional.
From the foregoing cases certain important principles can be deduced
by which the Emergency Price Control Act can be tested. First of all
it will be seen that if the act is to be justified under the Constitution,
it must be sustained under the "war powers" of Congress. This is the
grounds by which the cases have sustained the act. However, since the
act creates an administrative agency to carry out its purpose, several
important questions immediately arise: (1) Was there a valid delegation of power by Congress? (2) Were the functions to be performed by
the administrator legislative or judicial? and (3) was "due process of
law" given the individual by the provisions of the act?
Under the first question as to the delegation of powers by Congress,
most of the cases have held that there was a valid delegation. They
base their decisions on the ground that Congress has in the act itself,
established a definite policy and purpose or framework of limitations
within which the administrator must confine his operations. Citing the
provisions of the act like establishing rent as of April 1, 1941, the courts
say that standards are sufficiently designated so that the administrator
is merely carrying out the legislative policy as set by Congress.
However, the two main cases which hold the act unconstitutional on
this ground feel that the act does not establish any standard nor any
definite policy of legislative enactment. Rather these cases feel that
the act leaves the administrator free to legislate by himself. In other
words, the administrator determines what the law will be, he enacts it
by order, and then carries it out. This, as far as these courts are
concerned, is going too far to uphold the delegation of power to an
administrative agency. One of the courts20 said that the provision of the
act setting April 1, 1941, as the basis for setting rents was a mere
subsidiary provision which was not binding on the administrator since
he could use that date or any other date as he saw fit. The court concluded that this was no limitation or standard set for the administrator
since he could disregard it. Thus the question is a very close one, and the
answer to it depends upon whether the courts take a sympathetic
20

Payne v. Griffin, 51 F. Supp. 588 (1943).
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attitude toward the principle of administrative agencies or a contrary
attitude.
As to the second question, whether the functions to be exercised are
legislative or judicial, the courts seem to be generally agreed. It is held
that the administrator is to exercise legislative functions since it is the
formulation of policy to effect general conduct in the future. The cases
that uphold the act as constitutional, designate the powers under it as
legislative. Thus they dispense with the requifement of notice and
hearing on the ground that since no notice and hearing are required for
legislative action, none is required in exercising legislative functions by
the administrator.
The cases which hold the act unconstitutional do not specifically
mention whether the functions are legislative or not. But they do bring
out the third problem, "due process," under the Act. These courts said
that "due process" was denied because the administrator could arbitrarily set rentals without hearings or making any determinations of
fact. One case went further and stated that "due procss" was denied
because there was no provision for hearings and that this defect was
not remedied by appeal processes since they were inconvenient and
expensive.
The courts which upheld the act say that since there is a valid
delegation of power the act is good. But they do not touch directly on
the question of "due process" except to say that the aggrieved individual
does have a chance to test the actions of the administrator by the appeal
process of the act.
Since it appears that the Supreme Court will, if possible, read implied
notice and hearing into an act to save it constitutionally, the question
of "due process" can be defeated-as a stumbling block to the act. This
device is important since the entire validity of the act may depend on
this question.
Since the decision of Payne v. Griffin2l the entire question of the
constitutionality of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 was left
directly in the lap of the Supreme Court. The court was not long in
passing on this important problem for on March 27, 1944, the case of
Bowles v. Willinghns22 was decided.
This case involved the very questions of constitutionality, which all
the previous cases had considered including the decisions of Roach V.
Johnson, supra, and Payne v. Griffin, supra, which had ruled the act
unconstitutional.
The Willinghan case arose in Georgia. Mrs. Willinghan sought to
rent her apartments which had not been rented on April 1, 1941, in the
summer of 1941. The Rent Director gave notice that the rents were to
be decreased since they were greater than the maximum of those generally prevailing in the area for comparable quarters on April 1, 1941.
21 61 F. SuPDP. 588 (1943).
22 64 Sup. Ct. Repr. 641, 88 L. Ed 626 (1944).
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Mrs. Willingban filed her objection, but the Rent Director advised her
that he would issue the order for the reduction. Mrs. Willinghan filed
to enjoin the issuance of the order in the Georgia court and a temporary
injunction with an order to show cause was issued. The Office of Price
Administration brought this suit in the Federal District Court to
restrain Mrs. Willinghan from proceeding further in the Georgia court.
The Federal district court of Georgia, in line with its decision in the
Payne v Griffin case, dismissed the Administrator's bill. The case was
then brought on direct appeal to the Supreme Court. The court revised
the decision of the District Court and upheld the Emergency Price
Control Act of 1942 as constitutional. The court answered the principal
attacks made on the validity of the act which have been considered above.
First, it considered the question of the "delegation of powers." The
court held that the act "sufficiently" set up standards or limits to guide
the Administrator in regulating rents. These standards are sufficient
in that maximum rents shall be fixed for a defense renlil area whenever,
in the judgment of the Administrator, it is necessary or proper to give
effect to the purpose of the act. It is sufficient in that the rents shall be
"generally fair and equitable," and that the administrator, insofar as
practicable, shall ascertain and consider the rents prevailing on a designated date, April 1, 1941, with the right to choose an earlier date or a
later date under certain circumstances. Further, the Act is sufficiently
definite in its prescribed standards even though the Administrator is
allowed to make adjustments and exceptions for relevant factors in
order to give effect to the purpose of the Act. Mr. Justice Douglas said:
"There is no grant of unbridled administrative discretionCongress has not told the Administrator to fix rents whenever and wherever he might like and at whatever levels he
pleases. Congress has directed that maximum rents be fixed
in those areas where defense activities have resulted or
threatened to result in increased rentals inconsistent with
the purpose of the Act. And it has supplied the standards
and the base period to guide the Administrator in determining what the maximum rentals should be in a given area."
The court then answers the question of the delegation of discretionary
powers. It held that where there is a delegation of authority to an
administrative officer, and there happens to be a zone for the exercise
of his discretion, this does not make the delegation unconstitutional
provided that Congress has defined the limits and standards, and has
left to the Administrator the mere work of applying the statute to
different situations which arise. The court so found the necessary limits
and standards included in the act and thus overcame the objection of
discretionary power in the Administrator.
The court held in regard to the sufficiency of the standards that in
the exercise of the war power through the Price Control Act, it is not
unconstitutional because the Act provides merely that the rents shall
be fixed "generally fair and equitable" with regard to each individual
landlord. The court said:
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"A nation which can demand the lives of its men and women
in the waging of the war is under o constitutionalnecessity of providing a system of price control on the domestic
front which will assure each landlord a "fair return" on his
property."
The court discussed the problem of due process of law and held in
effect that no greater burden is placed in the Federal Government by
the Fifth Amendment than is placed on the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment. And since the police power of the State is used to affect
individuals within a class and their property without violating the Fourteenth Amendment, the Federal Government, being under no greater
restraint within the Fifth Amendment, can certainly affect individual
landlords within the large class of landlords even to the extent of not
assuring to each one a "fair return" on his property.
The problem of notice and a hearing was also answered by the court
when it held that Congress need not require the Administrator to hold
hearings before an order or regulation is issued since ample provision
is made for a hearing and review by the Administrator and the courts
after the regulation has gone into effect. The exigencies of war make
it imperative that action be taken quickly.
Thus the constitutionality of the Emergency Price Control Act of
1942 is settled. However, with all due respect to the Supreme Court
and its decisions, there are several questions which the court did not
fully answer. For example, under the problem of the delegation of
powers, the court stated that sufficient standards were set by the Act
to guide the Administrator. However, the court does not explain with
much detail just what or how these standards are operative. There is
a distinction between stating that standards and limitations are present,
and actually pointing out these standards and how they limit the power
of the Administrator in his actual activities. In other words the court
did not show how the standards were definite and set so that the
Administrator would have to follow them or at least not surpass them.
In line with this, the Act itself sets the date of April 1, 1941, as the
basis to guide the Administrator in establishing the rents. But the Act
also adds that this date shall be given "due consideration" insofar "as
practicable." By the use of these terms, it can be clearly seen that if
the Administrator chose to disregard the bare date of April 1, 1941,
and use any date, he would not be violating the purpose of the Act
or exceeding his delegated powers.
The court points out that the rents must be "fair and equitable."
This may be true but the Act also provides that "as in his (administrator's) judgment (the rents) will be generally fair and equitable." Thus
the standard or limitation of "fair and equitable" is a standard only
insofar as the judgment of the Administrator makes it one.
The same point can be made of the court's decision in Yazlus v. United
States23 where the constitutionality of the Price Control sections of the
23 64 Sup. C. Repr. 660, 88 L. Ed. 653 (1944).
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Act were under attack on the same grounds. The court answered the
question of unbridled delegation of power in the same manner. Yet in
this case the court again did not show how the standards actually linited or confined the Price Administrator in his orders and regulations
under the Act. True the dates of October 1 to the 15th, 1941, are set
as a guide for the Administrator, .but still by the use of the words "in
his judgment" and "insofar as practicable" leave the door wide open
and tear down the standards or limits as far as the actual conduct of
the Administrators are concerned under the Act.
Under both of these decisions if it were assumed that the standards
or limits of the Act were definite and certain, there would still be the
complaint that the Administrator is absolutely free to use his discretion in the matter of fixing maximum prices or rents. While the use of
discretionary power is permitted under a delegation of power provided
that there are limits on the use of such power, still under this Act the
Administrators are free to use their discretion. For the words "in his
judgment" and "as far as practicable" take down the standards or limits,
if there be any, and open the way for unbridled discretionary action on
the part of these Administrators.
Thus it can be seen from the Supreme Court's decisions in both of
these recent cases that the question of the delegation of power to
an Administrator is not fully answered. However, it must be said that
the aims of the Act are worthy. It has probably been the one great
factor in preventing the disaster of inflation from breaking loose in this
country as a result of the spending of the government during this war
emergency. Without doubt this fact and the circumstance of the impact
of the war on our entire economic structure helped influence the Supreme
Court in its decisions. The justification or merits of this influence on the
Court are not passed upon here. The only purpose and aim here contained is to see how the court answered or failed to answer the attacks
on the constitutionality of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942.
-- Charles M. Boynton.

